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# External States and the Indian Ocean: The Potential for Confrontation

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UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND  
KINGSTON, R.I.

RESEARCH PAPER

EXTERNAL STATES AND THE INDIAN OCEAN;  
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFRONTATION

by

James P. Cartwright

Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

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EXTERNAL STATES AND THE INDIAN OCEAN:  
THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTRONTATION (U)

by

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Lieutenant Commander, U.S. Navy

A Research Paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College and The University of Rhode Island in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Master of Marine Affairs.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:

*James P. Cartwright*

19 June 1972

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*John R. Hutchinson* 216p 72

Abstract of  
CONVERGENCE OF EXTERNAL POWER INTERESTS IN THE  
INDIAN OCEAN: PATTERN FOR CONFRONTATION

A study of the common interests of internal and external states in the Indian Ocean and identification of the methods, and their potential for confrontation, employed by external powers in pursuit of their interests. The historical interests of external powers in the Indian Ocean are depicted. Common interests, which have commanded the attention of internal states and external powers during recent years, are identified. The Indian Ocean is divided into five regions, each region characterized by the aforementioned common interests. The assets, mutual relations and interests of the littoral states comprising each region are described. The interests and methods of projecting these interests by China, Japan, Western Europe, Soviet Union and the United States are delineated. The paper finds that external power interests are competing at an increasing rate in the Indian Ocean area. As the interests converge, the potential for confrontation, particularly between the United States and Russia, resulting from methods of operation and uncontrollable events, increases. U.S. policy makers must clearly define U.S.-Indian Ocean objectives, to maximize effective utilization of resources in pursuit thereof.

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EXTERNAL STATES AND THE INDIAN OCEAN:  
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CHAPTER I

INDIAN OCEAN OVERVIEW

Introduction. Historically the United States has concentrated its maritime interests in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Only since 1967, have events caused the United States to direct an increasingly large proportion of its attention to the Indian Ocean. Thus it is appropriate to ask the questions, does the United States have any national interests in the Indian Ocean and what elements of the Indian Ocean might command U.S. interest?

Literature offers very little information about the Indian Ocean as a whole, with only a couple of significant works appearing in the English language during the past twenty years.<sup>1</sup> Similarly, exploration of the ocean area was practically nonexistent until the International Indian Ocean Expedition, conducted from 1959-1965. The purposes of the expedition, involving scientists from some thirty nations, were to gather information and reproduce a map of the Indian Ocean floor, to track currents, to explore the living and nonliving resources of the ocean and seabed, and to study the weather conditions throughout the area.<sup>2</sup>

None of these efforts was devoted to any strategy considerations of the Indian Ocean. However, since Britain announced its intention to withdraw militarily from the Indian Ocean in the mid-sixties, and essentially transformed this intention into reality by the end of 1971, interests of a number of nations external to the Indian Ocean steadily increased. This is particularly true since early 1968, when the Soviet Union commenced a dedicated, fairly sizable and almost continuous naval presence in the Indian Ocean region. Since the announced British plan to withdraw, a significant increase in printed matter has been published about the Indian Ocean region. Much of it is devoted to enumerating, evaluating and analyzing Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean. Pertaining to the Soviet naval presence, hypotheses range from eventual control of Middle East oil assets, support of an effort to acquire Asian markets and promote Soviet diplomatic stature, and containment of China's influence throughout the area.<sup>3</sup>

A number of conferences were devoted to the Indian Ocean region during the past year. Perhaps the most extensive was the conference conducted by The Center for Strategic and International Studies on 18 and 19 March 1971. Discussions of the effects of British withdrawal and increased Soviet naval presence were conducted by eleven countries, and over three hundred persons attended the conference.<sup>4</sup>



Similarly the United States Government has increasingly directed its attention to this region, as indicated by the Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, conducted 20, 22, 27 and 28 July 1971.<sup>5</sup>

What are the salient geographical and historical features of the Indian Ocean? Do interests exist which are common to internal states and external powers; and if so, can geographical regions be designated according to these common interests? What are the assets, interests and mutual relations of the littoral states? Which external powers are competing in the Indian Ocean at present, and what are their primary interests? As Soviet and U.S. interests converge in the area, what potential confrontations are likely to evolve? Each of these questions is examined in the following chapters.

Geography. The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean in the world, comprising an area of 28,350,000 square miles. It is bordered on three sides: East Africa to the west, South Asia on the north, and the island chain of Southeast Asia in the east. Another description of the Indian Ocean identifies it as contained within a perimeter stretching from the northern limit of the Red Sea south to Cape Agulhas, South Africa, along the twenty degrees east longitude line to the Antarctic,

eastward to Australia and Tasmania, north to the coast of Asia, and back to the point of origin. It is considered an ocean of bays, the more prominent ones being the Bay of Bengal, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea.<sup>6</sup>

The Indian Ocean contains many islands, most of them economically unimpressive. Yet many are positioned in potentially strategic locations, especially when one plays the "what if" game of world events. Villiers provides a most interesting descriptive and historical picture of many of these islands.<sup>7</sup> Table I lists the principal islands and island groups, depicts their location, status, estimated size or numbers and population. Many of these islands and island groups are discussed in greater detail in the regional breakdown of the littoral states.

The Indian Ocean is primarily a tropical body of water, relatively free from fog, and free from drift ice and similar obstructions to navigation. Its sole open end, the south, provides it with a unique wind pattern. Trade winds prevail in the latitudes closest to the equator. The northern hemisphere winds, which blow to the north, tend to be favorable; but the southern hemisphere counterpart will occasionally cause severe hurricanes. These cyclonic storms can be a serious problem in the Indian Ocean, particularly in the west/central area near Mauritius from November through March. High winds exist in other locations throughout the Indian

Ocean, particularly off the Cape of Good Hope and in the vicinity of the southern most islands. The area encompassed by the forty and fifty degree south latitudes is respected for its fierce storms.<sup>8</sup>

The Indian Ocean is climatized by a rigid system of monsoons or seasons, particularly north of the equator. The two monsoons are the southwest (summer) and northeast (winter), which affect a stretch of water and land from the Mozambique Channel to the Bay of Bengal and arc across the Arabian Sea between their two terminal points. Each monsoon lasts for approximately half of the year. The southwest predominates between May and September, during which time it carries moisture from the ocean over land, resulting in regular and heavy rainfall. The northeast monsoon is predominant between November and March, resulting in the transport of cool, dry air from the land to the ocean. During the months of June through August, heavy weather engulfs the northeastern Indian Ocean coastline, significantly curtailing coastal shipping operations. The northeast monsoon creates an opposite effect, is characterized by fair weather, and permits uninhibited shipping throughout the northern hemisphere of the ocean, that area affected by both monsoons.<sup>9</sup>

Local conditions prevail in other areas, particularly those of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. Each of these regions is often exceedingly uncomfortable, particularly during the



summer months. The main causes of this discomfort are excessive temperatures, often reaching 120 degrees fahrenheit, high humidity and debilitating sand storms.<sup>10</sup>

Currents also are influenced by the monsoon behavioral pattern, reversing in direction every six months. Perhaps the Somali current, which flows along the northeastern coast of Africa between Madagascar and the Socotra Islands, is the most impressive. It is about one hundred miles wide, exists from the surface to depths in thousands of feet, and often attains a velocity of seven knots.<sup>11</sup>

A tremendous midoceanic submarine ridge runs roughly north to south, entering through the Gulf of Aden, gradually altering course from east to south and proceeding in a southerly direction, with the ridge center located along the sixty-seven degrees east longitude line. East of Madagascar, the ridge splits into southeast and southwest paths, which eventually pass south of Australia and South Africa respectively. Portions of the ridge achieve a width of 1,500 miles and heights of 10,000 feet above the average 16,000 foot depth of the abyssal plains. The ridge is part of the worldwide Mid-Oceanic Ridge, consisting of undersea mountains and valleys which run through the centers of the ocean basins and extend about 40,000 miles.<sup>12</sup>

The ocean is comprised of three seas (Red, Arabian, Andaman), five primary gulfs (Persian, Oman, Suez, Aden,

Aquaba) and the Bay of Bengal. These bodies of water are perhaps most important with regard to the role they play as access passageways to and from the Indian Ocean.

The principal access ways to the Indian Ocean are: Cape of Good Hope around South Africa; Suez Canal (when open) via the Mediterranean Sea, Gulf of Suez, Red Sea, and Gulf of Aden; Strait of Malacca; Sunda Strait, Lombok Strait and a number of lesser candidates north of Australia; and around Australia to the south. Today the dominant entry/ departure routes pass through the Strait of Malacca in the east and around South Africa in the west. Table II depicts the more prominent straits serving the Indian Ocean.

Marine Resources. Compared with the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, the Indian Ocean contains relatively few living and nonliving resources. Most of the resources which are present are not extensively exploited, the exception being offshore oil in the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Suez. Oil production there is increasing. Fisheries have developed slowly, because of the lack of dense population along some of the coasts adjacent to the most productive fishing areas. In 1967, only two million tons of fish were caught compared with twenty and twenty-seven million tons in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans respectively. The principal countries involved in fishing the Indian Ocean are India (1.4 million

tons), Pakistan (.4 million tons) and South Africa (.9 million tons), but much of South Africa's catch was in the Atlantic. Most of the people of the littoral states eat very little fish, and India, Pakistan and Iran have recently begun to export fish. The Russian and Japanese fishing fleets are increasing their efforts in the Indian Ocean, and the assistance they are providing to a few of the littoral states may result in more local exploitation of this resource. A small but increasing amount of shrimping is done in the Persian Gulf area, and some interest is devoted to shells, pearls, and coral in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf.<sup>13</sup>

Nonliving resources, with the exception of the aforementioned offshore oil reserves, and a few chemical plants utilizing salt deposits, are not extensive. Some deep holes in the Red Sea containing hot, very salty (ten times the average) water were found to contain rich concentrations of iron, copper, silver and gold.<sup>14</sup> Thus far technology has not permitted efficient recovery of these resources. Expeditions devoted to scientific research have yielded increased knowledge of the Indian Ocean, such as the discovery of upwelling areas in the Arabian Sea and Bay of Bengal that were ten to twenty times more nutritious than average seawater. This and similar discoveries may lead to sizable fisheries and other exploitable ventures.<sup>15</sup>



History. A historical review of the Indian Ocean reveals that once external powers began sailing in its waters, external dominance commenced over most of the internal states. For nearly five centuries, European maritime powers retained almost exclusive control of the Indian Ocean.

Portugal introduced European influence into the Indian Ocean in 1498, when Vasco da Gama sailed from Portugal to Calicut, India, via the west coast of Africa, Cape of Good Hope and East African coast. The Portuguese immediately exercised control of the Indian Ocean. A number of sea battles occurred between Portuguese and Indian fleets, generally ending in a draw. India, with assistance from Egyptian and Turkish allies, and the brave and efficient efforts of Admiral Kunjoli III, used its smaller but faster vessels to counter the more powerful Portuguese ships. Eventually Portugal gained control of the northern Indian Ocean defense points of Socotra Island, Ormus (Persian Gulf), Goa (India) and Malucca (Malaysia), primarily through the efforts of Affonso Albuquerque, a capable statesman and administrator.<sup>16</sup> Sporadic Portuguese/Indian encounters continued during the 1500s, but did not significantly reduce Portugal's control of the area.

Early in the 1600s, the Dutch established a presence on Java, gradually expanded to the west, and captured Malucca in 1641. The Dutch infiltration continued west, resulting in

the occupation of Colombo, Ceylon, in 1654 and subsequent excursions into East Africa. By 1670, Portuguese maritime power had vanished from the Indian Ocean.<sup>17</sup>

During the time from 1650-1750, a series of British, French, and Dutch projections into the Indian Ocean met with varying degrees of success. India's increased naval strength was reasonably successful in neutralizing British and Dutch efforts to secure land bases in India. Primarily through the efforts and ability of Admiral Kanhoji Angre, the Indian fleet consistently countered British, Dutch and Portuguese naval actions directed against India.

During the period 1750-1780 the British secured control of the Bay of Bengal area. The French, who had acquired territorial possessions in Madagascar, Mauritius, and La Reunion Islands, conducted a number of naval battles with the British in the Bay of Bengal area. Although blessed with a great naval leader, Pierre Andre de Suffren Saint Tropez, the lack of subordinate cooperation and immediate base facilities to support fleet operations near India, restricted the French to limited and short-term success against the British.<sup>18</sup> During the latter 1700s, British power proved dominant, and Britain acquired control of Ceylon, Malucca, Mauritius, South Africa, Aden, Ormuz and in 1824 Singapore. When the French fleet was annihilated at Trafalgar in 1805, the British Navy became the only naval power in the world, and



thus commenced 136 years of unchallenged supremacy in the Indian Ocean, commonly referred to as a "British Lake."<sup>19</sup>

During the 19th century, the British consolidated their Indian Ocean empire. Absolute control of the primary entrance points--Suez/Red Sea route, Cape of Good Hope, Strait of Malacca--was achieved and external powers were excluded from the area.<sup>20</sup> British trade, primarily through the East India Company, flourished throughout the area. Opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 served to strengthen Britain's logistics and reinforcement capability in the Indian Ocean by reducing the water route to India from 10,500 nautical miles around the Cape of Good Hope to 5,900 nautical miles through the Mediterranean Sea. By 1890, British possessions throughout the Indian Ocean consisted of South Africa, Kenya, British Somaliland, Egypt, South Arabia, Trucial States, Iraq, Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Singapore.

From 1890 to the 1930s, colonization efforts, primarily in Africa, were conducted by a number of European states. Specifically, Germany controlled Tanganyika and Zanzibar, Italy--Somaliland and Eritrea, France--Madagascar and Jibuti.<sup>21</sup> World War I ended Germany's influence in the Indian Ocean. Between the wars, Italy reinforced its position in Eritrea and Italian Somaliland, building naval bases at Massawa, Eritrea, and Mogadishu, Somaliland. Italy hoped to control the northwest approach to the Indian Ocean. France turned

Diego Suarez, Madagascar, into a strong naval base, and as the Japanese threat increased, Britain significantly strengthened Singapore.

During the middle 1930s, Italy formulated plans and conducted operations to conquer Ethiopia. For many months League of Nations action vacillated and eventually Italy attacked Ethiopia in force. Economic and military sanctions against Italy were applied by the League, but not until Italy had occupied Ethiopia.<sup>22</sup>

Japanese conquests expanded rapidly in the late 1930s and 1940/41 with the Malayan Peninsula, Indonesia and finally Singapore falling into Japanese hands. Only a few naval engagements occurred in the Indian Ocean during World War II. In 1942, a sizable Japanese naval force entered the Indian Ocean, destroyed most of the British fleet at Trincomalee, Ceylon, and quickly withdrew to confront a U.S. naval force in the Coral Sea.<sup>23</sup> Japanese submarines destroyed a considerable amount of shipping, primarily in the Arabian Sea, and the British maintained a small naval force at Diego Suarez, Madagascar. Japan eventually occupied Burma and the Nicobar/Andaman Island group and threatened Ceylon before halting her expansion into the Indian Ocean. The western Indian Ocean did serve as an important supply pipeline to Russia, via the Persian Gulf, Karachi, Iran and the Caspian Sea, and to China, via India's eastern ports.<sup>24</sup>

Since World War II, the British colonial empire has rapidly vanished, as the force of nationalism resulted in most of the African, South Asia and East Asia countries gaining their independence. The British Commonwealth still exists, but it is not a powerful organization, and its members often pursue their own national interests quite independent of Commonwealth ties. Although the members consult together on many matters, various alliances and regional interests have replaced any obligation or interest in supporting a common policy.<sup>25</sup>

Britain still retained a defense posture throughout the Indian Ocean, with its arc of facilities comprised of Singapore, Persian Gulf area, and Aden. However, questions were debated in England concerning the purposes and capabilities of such outposts, particularly as their support costs became an increasing financial burden. In 1967, the decision was made to withdraw forces from Aden, Singapore and most of the Persian Gulf area by the end of 1971.<sup>26</sup>

The preceding brief summary of Indian Ocean history merely attempted to indicate the more significant events which have occurred in the Indian Ocean area. Maritime rule of the area by external powers introduced and sustained imperialism therein for nearly five hundred years. It enabled Britain to dominate the region for 150 years.



## CHAPTER II

### INTERESTS OF INTERNAL STATES OF THE INDIAN OCEAN

The littoral states of the Indian Ocean area can be assigned to regions, each one representing a primary or set of primary interests which distinguish it from the others. The interests specified appear to encompass most of the pertinent interests in the area which have commanded the attention of both the internal states and external powers during recent years. Table III depicts the five Indian Ocean regions and their associated primary interests.

The interests selected relate to each region in a geographic context--that is the immediate events associated with each interest occur in the specified area. The various forms of self projection utilized by the external powers with respect to each interest are primarily focused in the related regions. Certainly side effects occur and many of the littoral states are concerned with all or most of these interests in varying degrees. For instance, the states of the "oil" region, Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area, are partially dependent upon unrestricted passage of ships along the Cape of Good Hope trade route, since a significant portion of their oil is exported along that sea lane to Western Europe. Similarly, economic development is an interest of all nations;

but relatively speaking this subject is of prime concern to the Western region states, particularly the island territories therein.

A brief insight will be provided identifying the concerns, ocean assets and naval/air capabilities of the principal states comprising each region, attempting to reveal the significance of the primary interests to these states.

If there is such a thing as a single common interest of the majority of the states of the Indian Ocean, it was probably best stated at the Conference of Nonaligned Countries which met in Lusaka, Zambia, on 8-10 September 1970. Usually referred to as the Lusaka Declaration, one of the goals pledged by the attendees reads as follows:

A declaration should be adopted calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition, either army, navy, or air force should also be free of nuclear weapons.<sup>1</sup>

In addition the Conference urged the "adoption of a Declaration of Principles on the peaceful uses of the seabed and the exploration and exploitation of its resources."<sup>2</sup>

Thus the general theme of many of the littoral states is that the Indian Ocean should not become an area of big power competition and, perhaps, ultimately confrontation. More realistically, they concede that the big powers are

already present, and that prevention of dominance by a single external power is probably the most suitable alternative.

### West Indian Ocean Region.

General Description. The Western region is composed of four African states; South Africa, Mozambique, Tanzania and Kenya plus six western island areas, Malagasy Republic (Madagascar), Mauritius, Comoro Islands, La Reunion, Seychelles and the British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), which consists of the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquhar and Deroches Islands. Tables IV and V are status charts which provide a variety of information about each territory.

Four primary interests pertaining to the region are economic development, South Africa's status, trade routes around the Cape of Good Hope, and potential island bases. Not all of the interests are primary concerns of the littoral states and territories, but each is important to the area as a whole when external interests are also included.

Certain events and situations seem to attract most of the attention given to the Western region. The closing of the Suez Canal in June 1967, significantly increased the shipping activity around the Cape of Good Hope. The policy of apartheid maintained by the South African Government has been a particularly abrasive factor to the Black nations of the



area. A similar situation exists in Rhodesia. Mozambique, which is controlled by the Portuguese, and South Africa are utilized by Rhodesia as supply lanes, thwarting much of the effectiveness of the United Nation's economic sanctions levied against Rhodesia.<sup>3</sup> Competition, real or illusory, among external powers for island bases throughout the Indian Ocean, involves a whole set of Western island concerns. These concerns vary with the islands, ranging from dependence upon controlling or former controlling states to regional development problems. Each of these concerns is related to the present economic dependence of these islands, and the "optimum" path or paths which should be selected to enhance economic development in the future.

Development Status. All the states and territories in the Western region are considered lesser developed countries with the exception of South Africa. They possess relatively few resources, tend to concentrate on agriculture and light industry, but with very limited diversification. Annual per capita income averages about one hundred dollars, with only South Africa's value appreciably higher.<sup>4</sup>

Marine Orientation. The continental shelf rarely extends more than twenty nautical miles off any coast, the few exceptions being off central Mozambique, northwestern

Madagascar, and South Africa where the distances average about forty nautical miles and occasionally extend to roughly one hundred miles. The Seychelles Island group possesses a sizable shelf area, perhaps as large as 140,000 square nautical miles. South Africa is the only country in the Western region exploiting fisheries resources, and most of its fish are caught off its western coast. In 1970, South Africa caught 1.5 million metric tons of fish, ranking in the top ten countries of the world. Although Kenya, Tanzania and Mauritius are expanding their fishing capability, only Tanzania exceeded one hundred thousand metric tons in 1970.<sup>5</sup> None of the states have discovered or developed significant offshore mineral resources, although most are increasing exploration of their shelves. South Africa has the only sizable ocean fleet, but most of the ports have experienced increased vessel arrivals since the closure of the Suez Canal. Prominent ports are few, however, with only Mombassa, Kenya, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, Beria, and Lourenco Marques, Mozambique, and Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town, South Africa so considered.<sup>6</sup> South Africa and Mozambique handle the largest quantities of goods in their ports.

Mutual Relations. The western islands, Malagasy Republic, Mauritius, Comoro, La Reunion, Seychelles and BIOT,



have been called a bridge between Asia and Africa, primarily because of their mixture of peoples. Regional commercial relations, mutually between the islands and also with African states, has been inhibited primarily because of British and French methods of control. Consequently the islands are almost totally dependent upon Britain and France for trade and security matters. The tendency today is for more regional trade, particularly with South Africa. It appears that mutually profitable trade relations can transcend disapproval of government methods. The increased shipping around the Cape has helped to stimulate the idea of regional cooperation. Unfortunately most of the island shipping is controlled by European organizations, who have not always acted in the best interests of the islands. However, there is a general concern by most of the islands over the increased Soviet naval presence, and the majority of these states and territories support a continuing presence by Britain and France. At present, the islands provide Britain and France with a few base facilities, historically acquired, which are not heavily utilized today.<sup>7</sup> It is the uncertainty associated with external power intentions and unknown forthcoming events which make these potential bases most interesting.

The Black African states are adamant in their condemnation of South Africa's policies. They interpret South Africa's request to Britain for increased military aid, as an effort to

attain support for the policies of apartheid, and not concern over the increased Soviet Indian Ocean presence. Tanzania's attitude, which summarizes the Black African states' viewpoints, supports the Lusaka Declaration's plea for a neutral Indian Ocean, but also recognizes Britain's interest in insuring the security of the shipping lanes. Rather than have Britain support this interest through increased aid to South Africa, Tanzania recommended that Britain be provided bases elsewhere in the area, possibly in Madagascar or Mauritius, in return for a reduction in British aid to South Africa. Tanzania argues that this concept does not violate the Lusaka Declaration, since historical precedence exists for Britain's Indian Ocean presence.<sup>8</sup>

The Union of South Africa is also very much concerned with maintaining free trade routes around the Cape, for eighty percent of its foreign trade is conducted through Indian Ocean ports. South Africa is the only state in the Western Region that possesses a moderate maritime force, including a Navy which consists of six ASW frigates, three with support helicopters, and approximately 130 fighter/bomber aircraft. South Africa also possesses the industrial capacity and transportation network necessary to sustain and support military operations. The remainder of the states can only muster a few patrol vessels, essentially no air

power and minimal logistic support.<sup>9</sup> Consequently for security reasons, the reluctance of South Africa's neighbors to see it receive any additional aid is understandable.

The predominant force of influence in the area appears to be Britain's residual presence. Kenya, Tanzania, South Africa, Mauritius and Madagascar were all British possessions for various periods of time in the past, while BIOT and the Seychelles remain so today. Coupled with the strong post-World War II growth of nationalism, Portugal's control of Mozambique, South Africa's apartheid policies and the islands' contribution, yet to be determined, the Western Indian Ocean Region emerges as a complex area, certain to undergo more changes before achieving stability and prosperity.

#### Northwest Indian Ocean Region.

General Description. The Northwest region is composed of five African states and territories; Somali Republic, Ethiopia, Sudan, United Arab Republic, or Egypt, and Afars and the Issas (formerly French Somaliland) Territory plus Israel and Jordan. Tables VI and VII provide a few facts about each territory.

Two interests are dominant in the area; the primary one being the Israel/Arab conflict, the lesser one the closely related Suez Canal situation. Both of these interests have



commanded world attention, and especially sizable economic and military outlays by the Soviet Union and the United States.

I am not going to dwell at length about the Israeli-Arab situation. It ranks as one of the key problem areas of the world, primarily because of its potential for causing an unplanned confrontation between the two superpowers, and also due to the fanatical hatred and nearly total inflexibility on the part of the combatants. A willingness to compromise by the Jewish/Arab participants is simply not present. Consequently, the many outside attempts to seek an amenable solution have failed, seldom even achieving the slightest concession by anyone. The projection of U.S. and Soviet interests on opposing sides is, officially, to guarantee a balance of power between the adversaries and theoretically to breed stability in the region. However, both powers are also determined to prevent total forfeiture of their own influence in the area and the likely followon loss of sizable investments and stature. The Suez Canal has been closed since June 1967, as a result of the Israeli/Arab six day war. The immediate effect of the closure was the rerouting of shipping, especially that between the Persian Gulf/South Asia areas and the Western Europe/Mediterranean areas. Since more than twenty thousand ships passed through the

canal during 1966, the closing of the canal has affected the purse strings of many nations.<sup>10</sup> Long-term effects, such as increased transportation costs, doubling and tripling of shipping distances in many instances, development of super-tankers, and significant reduction in the revenue of certain ports in the Red Sea, Gulf of Suez and Gulf of Aden area, have occurred.

Today the key issues seem to be the short and long-term effects which might result from opening the Canal, and speculation about which state or states will benefit the most from such an event. There is general agreement that three of the effects would be as follows:

- . first step toward possible settlement of Arab/Israeli conflict
- . reduced probability of U.S./Soviet confrontation in the Suez area
- . reduction in shipping costs for many consumers.

Table VIII provides an assessment of who would gain the most from an open Canal.

There are certainly other loss/gain considerations, but those listed in Table VIII seem to be the ones most often mentioned. One disturbing conclusion is that the potential Soviet gains appear to be substantial while those of the United States do not.

Development Status. All of the states and territories of the region except Israel are considered lesser developed countries. Annual per capita income ranges between one hundred and six hundred dollars, no GNP is greater than six billion dollars and only Israel's literacy rate exceeds forty percent.<sup>11</sup> As in the Western region, the states are primarily dependent upon agricultural products (limited in number) and light industry. While the closure of the Canal has hurt world trade, it has stimulated increased regional trade. The majority of the states are making economic progress according to most measurement indicators. Unfortunately the instability of much of the area has limited regional investment.

Marine Orientation. Although the region possesses a coastline approximately 3,500 miles long, very little exploitation is made of the resources of the sea. Except for Egypt, the fishing industries are undeveloped, although Somali and Ethiopia are attempting to increase their capability. Only Ethiopia has a sizable continental shelf, extending more than fifty miles offshore along most of the coast. The other shelves are seldom wider than ten miles.

Although some offshore mineral exploration is being conducted, only Egypt is producing any offshore oil in the Gulf of Suez. Perhaps the potentially most valuable mineral



resources are the Red Sea deposits, located near the center of the Red Sea, between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, in depressions about 2,000 meters deep. These deposits, or "hot brines," are extremely warm and salty, and analysis revealed that they contain several percent zinc and copper plus lesser portions of lead, silver and gold.<sup>12</sup> Who might exploit these deposits is not clear. Although the mining technology for efficient recovery is not yet available, three companies have already applied to three different states for leasing rights.<sup>13</sup>

The major ports throughout the region are listed in Table VII. The recent trend is to improve port facilities, primarily with outside help. Somalian ports and Djibouti are the most active in this development. The opening of the Suez Canal would certainly increase the business of the region's ports.

Mutual Relations. The states of the region are splintered not only by their religious differences but also by the fact that they have different benefactors. Beside the Arab/Israeli conflict and Suez Canal dilemma previously mentioned, Ethiopia has perhaps the most complex problems. Its relations with Somalia and the Arab world are often unpleasant, as rebels in southeastern Ethiopia receive support from Somalia, and the independence movement by the Eritreans

is supported by Arab elements. Ethiopia has a number of options, ranging from development of closer ties with East African states, which it has done with Kenya, to joining the Arab world, or attempting to follow an independent path. Resolving disputes with Somalia would perhaps be the most stabilizing event.<sup>14</sup>

The Egyptian and Israeli forces tend to confront each other away from the Red Sea area. Ethiopia, Sudan and Somalia all have navies and air forces, relatively small and comparable with each other. Patrol type vessels and a few fighter/bomber aircraft are the general force composition.<sup>15</sup>

France, which still maintains a small force in its Afars/Issas territory, Britain, and Italy all possessed colonies in the region in the past. Their influence, other than perhaps economically oriented, appears quite marginal today. The primary interests have drawn the two superpowers into the region, resulting in the input of new forces of influence as well as large quantities of foreign aid.

#### Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region.

General Description. This relatively small but tremendously important portion of the Indian Ocean area has received a tremendous amount of external power attention in recent years. The region consists of ten nations, one a



union of six or seven Arab Emirates, plus Yemen, The Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDR of Yemen--formerly South Yemen), Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and Iran. Tables IX and X offer a brief description of each nation, including past and present affiliations.

One interest far overshadows all others in the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf area, and that is oil. Whatever statistics are studied, either oil reserves, oil production or oil revenue, the importance of this resource to the region is readily confirmed. Table XI depicts the status of proven oil reserves throughout the world. Approximately sixty percent of the world's known oil reserves are located in the Middle East, and the vast majority specifically in the Persian Gulf area.

Production figures are equally impressive, as about thirty percent of the world's oil is produced in the Persian Gulf area today. Table XII indicates production figures between the years 1959 through 1971. The value of this oil to the oil producing states is reflected in Table XIII, which delineates the oil revenues each state has realized during the period 1965 through 1970.

The preceding two tables demonstrate the degree of dependence on oil production and the resultant revenues upon which many of the Persian Gulf countries rely. Any interruption of this source of income would be severely felt

within these nations and not well received. Furthermore the importance of Persian Gulf oil to outside states is appreciated when one observes that Japan and Western Europe import approximately eighty-five percent and fifty percent of their oil respectively from the Persian Gulf area.

Production and transportation costs also reveal some interesting aspects of the Persian Gulf oil situation. The estimated production costs per barrel in the major oil areas of the world are listed in Table XIV. Transportation costs reveal that oil shipments to Western Europe from Venezuela are thirty-eight cents per barrel cheaper than those from the Middle East, while shipments from North Africa are fifty-four cents per barrel cheaper than Middle East supplies. Prior to the closure of the Suez Canal in 1967, the corresponding figures for Venezuela and North Africa oil shipments relative to the Middle East were twenty-three cents and thirty-seven cents per barrel cheaper respectively.<sup>16</sup> Thus from Western Europe's point of view, since North African and Middle East production costs are nearly equivalent, the lower transportation cost from North Africa certainly places its oil in a favorable competitive position with the Middle East oil. However, while North African oil may be cheaper, it also appears to be riskier, since the policies of the Libyan government tend to be unpredictable. This consideration, coupled with substantial Western European investments

in the Middle East, most likely insure that Western Europe will remain a large purchaser of Middle East Oil. Compared to Venezuelan oil, Middle East oil is cheaper to Western European states, for the lower transportation cost from Venezuela is overshadowed by the greater production expense.

Japan has few alternatives other than utilizing Middle East oil. Although Indonesia is much closer and Japan is providing exploration assistance to that nation, production is still only about five percent that of the Middle East. Consequently Japan will continue purchasing large quantities of Persian Gulf oil in the foreseeable future. Maintaining friendly relations throughout the Indian Ocean area and insuring that shipping lanes are not severed or threatened are major objectives of Japan.

Development Status. The states of the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf Region present an economic picture of contrast. A few possess significant wealth, most of which has not been used appreciably to improve the economic condition of the state or its people. The countries best resembling this category are Oman, Abu Dhabi, Dubai and possibly Kuwait. Similarly the states of Saudi Arabia, Iran and to a lesser extent Iraq also have tremendous oil revenues, but they have fairly extensive development plans in effect, which should continue to improve the economic situations in



these countries.<sup>17</sup> A final group, Yemen, Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen and the five other members of the Union of Arab Emirates, is conspicuous by its lack of wealth. Exploration is underway, but none of these states has located any oil resources. The gross national product (GNP) of the wealthier nations ranges between 2.8 and 8.3 billion dollars while minimum per capita income is three hundred dollars. Conversely Yemen and PDR of Yemen have GNPs of 500 and 127 million dollars respectively, and average per capita incomes of roughly 115 dollars.<sup>18</sup>

In general, mining and agricultural output is very low throughout the area; Iran and Saudi Arabia produce the most in each category. The literacy rate is extremely low in most states, although some improvement is gradually occurring.

Marine Orientation. The Persian Gulf/Arabian Sea bodies of water are two of the most plentiful sources of fish, shrimp and oysters in the Indian Ocean. Interest in fishing varies considerably by country. The PDR of Yemen and Oman are the area leaders in fisheries exploitation, while Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Iran catch smaller quantities. The Persian Gulf is a rich shrimp source, particularly along the western coast and the central eastern coast. Kuwait has landed the largest catches of shrimp, and has the most developed industry, with Bahrain, Iran and Saudi Arabia providing smaller

amounts. During the ten year period, 1959-1968, the total catch of shrimp increased from 739,000 pounds to 20,958,000 pounds.<sup>19</sup>

Regarding potential fisheries sources, the Arabian Sea area is considered most promising, primarily due to its prominence as an upwelling area. Its greatest limitation is that much of the area experiences very rough seas, particularly during the southwest monsoon season. Consequently fairly large fishing vessels will be required to exploit the region adequately.<sup>20</sup>

Substantial amounts of offshore oil exist in the Persian Gulf, and production and further exploration of this resource occurs extensively throughout the area. Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Dubai are involved in offshore oil production/exploration in varying degrees. No other marine activities of any significance occur within the region.

Table X lists the prominent ports belonging to each state in the area. Since the dominant business is oil, the busiest ports today are those that service the oil tankers in the Persian Gulf. Aden has suffered a severe decline in business, primarily the result of the closure of the Suez Canal. In general, the trend is one of new and improved facilities for most of the Persian Gulf ports.

The width of the continental shelf varies extensively throughout the Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf area. Saudi Arabia has a fairly extensive shelf, particularly in the southern portion of the Red Sea and in the Persian Gulf. Yemen also has a shelf width averaging more than thirty nautical miles. The shelf off Oman extends more than thirty nautical miles in places, but is generally narrow. Delimitation of the shelf in the Persian Gulf is a subject of dispute, particularly between Iran/Saudi Arabia and Iran/Iraq, although agreement was reached between the former.<sup>21</sup> The potential wealth of offshore oil provides a basis for sensitivity in these disputes.

Mutual Relations. The maze of entanglements and disputes which characterize the area make it impossible to delineate all these events. The most recent and more predominant relations will be described. The Arabian Peninsula is perhaps the region of greatest unrest, as rich (oil) and poor (no oil) countries interface, competition thrives as a number of states seek to fill the void of British departure, and various forms of interference by external states occur. Egypt supported a costly civil war in Yemen with men and materials throughout the middle sixties, which ended in a standoff. The PDR of Yemen gained its independence with the British departure of 1967, then saw the importance and



income of its port of Aden decline as the Suez Canal closed. It has experienced continual political and economic problems, is dependent upon Russian and Chinese aid, and has become a staging area for the export of insurgency. The PDR of Yemen supports rebels in the province of Eritrea (Ethiopia) and western Oman (Dhofar), where the Popular Front for Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) has the mission to "free all the people from Oman to Bahrain."<sup>22</sup> Saudi Arabia has maintained good relations with Yemen and Oman, and this has helped to limit the effectiveness of the PDR of Yemen's liberation movement support activities. Yemen has received Soviet aid, but tends to follow a neutral path, while Oman is dependent upon British military support. At various times Saudi Arabia has claimed portions of the Trucial States and opposed Iran over specific issues. Since Iran agreed to respect the wishes of Bahrain's people, thus essentially accepting Bahrain's independence, relations between Saudi Arabia/Iran have improved. With the British departure, Iran views itself as the logical party to assume a dominant role in Persian Gulf affairs. Iran is vitally interested in maintaining unhindered shipping transits for exporting oil in the Persian Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz. Possessing the strongest naval and air forces in the area, Iran prefers that external powers remain in the Indian Ocean and not interfere in the Gulf. To emphasize

its position, Iran occupied the Greater and Lesser Tumbs and Abu Musa Islands on 30 November 1971. The islands are strategically important, for they command the Strait of Hormuz, entrance to the Persian Gulf. Iran has worked to solidify her position of strength by improving relations with Russia during the sixties while maintaining good relations with the United States.

The Iraq regime has tended to be revolutionary and expansionistic, threatening Kuwait and Iran on various occasions. Unrest between Iran and Iraq has long been a historic fact, and will probably continue in the future.

#### Northern Indian Ocean Region.

General Description. The Northern Indian Ocean Area contains four nations and the Laccadive, Andaman and Nicobar island groups, each of which is owned by India. The primary interest in this region is the relationship between India and Pakistan, particularly the longstanding animosity between these states. Tables XV and XVI provide assorted information about the countries of the Northern Indian Ocean Region.

The disputes and fighting between India and Pakistan are not new, despite the fact that each country has been independent for only twenty-four years. The controversies

are primarily of a religious nature, with numerous conflicts between Hindus and Moslems occurring throughout the past centuries. The creation of separate Hindu and Moslem states in 1947 has not solved many of the problems, and two armed conflicts occurred in 1948/49 and 1965.<sup>23</sup>

The division of Pakistan into two components did not make administration and control an easy matter. The East was the poorer region, consisting of only fifteen percent of the nation's land, but containing fifty-four percent of the population.<sup>24</sup> East Pakistan was the agricultural base, while West Pakistan strove for industrial development. Relations between the two territories were often strained, with East Pakistan complaining that it had little voice in government matters and was often exploited by West Pakistan.

Much of the time martial law prevailed throughout Pakistan. East Pakistan won control of the majority of seats in the National Assembly during the December 1970 election. When the assembly was not convened as scheduled on 1 March 1971, extensive rioting and strikes occurred in East Pakistan. The Army was sent to subdue the uprising in the East and prevent any attempt to establish an independent state. The Army was successful, but used excessive force and brutality to accomplish its mission. As a result, during the eight month period of April through November 1971, nearly



ten million refugees crossed the border between East Pakistan and India. India was unable to halt the flow of refugees, the problems of caring for them became overwhelming, and relations between India and Pakistan steadily deteriorated. Both countries began increasing troop strengths along the borders, and in early December a number of infiltration and reprisal skirmishes quickly led to war. The war lasted fifteen days and ended with India controlling East Pakistan, and offering a truce, which was accepted and immediately followed by Pakistan's unconditional surrender of the Eastern region to India.<sup>25</sup> Subsequent events led to the establishment of a new nation, Bangladesh, and recognition by an increasing number of states.

Development Status. All of the states comprising the Northern area are considered underdeveloped. Annual per capita income ranges between 80 and 140 dollars, while only India has a gross national product greater than 15 billion dollars.<sup>26</sup> Although efforts have been made to expand industrialization, the vast majority of the people work in agriculture. Only India possesses sizable amounts of raw materials, the predominant one being iron ore.

One of the significant differences between the Northern region and the three Western areas is the tremendous population of the Northern area. Total population of the three

Western regions is about 200 million while the Northern region contains 710 million persons. The areas of the aforementioned regions are 5,600,000 square miles and 1,652,000 square miles respectively, which correspond to population densities of 36 and 429 persons per square mile. Such a population density has contributed to many of the problems of the area.

Marine Orientation. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon have growing fishing interests in the Indian Ocean. India, in particular, had a catch of 1.7 million tons in 1970. Ceylon and Pakistan caught lesser amounts, but increased development of the industry is anticipated in Pakistan with Russian assistance. However, the recent war setback coupled with Russia's support of India may curtail this assistance. Since 1961-1965, during which time India participated in the International Indian Ocean Expedition (IIOE), marine science programs have progressed substantially in India. Interest in fishing, oceanography and continental shelf exploitation is increasing.

Pakistan has made its greatest progress in fishing and fish processing development. Offshore mineral exploration is also receiving attention, particularly oil exploration in the Bay of Bengal. Other marine activities are still in the infant stage.<sup>27</sup>

India possesses a large continental shelf, particularly off its west coast, where it extends offshore more than 150 nautical miles in a few locations, and averages about fifty nautical miles width. The shelf off the east coast is generally less than thirty nautical miles except in the vicinity of Calcutta, where it approaches 110 nautical miles. Pakistan's shelf ranges from twenty to seventy nautical miles, the wider portion existing off Karachi. The continental shelf off Bangladesh is greater than seventy nautical miles in most locations. Ceylon has a very narrow shelf, seldom exceeding twenty nautical miles.

Mutual Relations. Mutual relations between India and Pakistan were addressed. India has fully supported the new regime in Bangladesh, and thus far cooperation between the two states is excellent. India can be expected to seek cordial relations with Bangladesh, for a "worry free" border in the east will be one less problem with which to cope. Ceylon and India are continuing to work toward closer relations, particularly in their efforts to rehabilitate stateless persons.<sup>28</sup> Little trade exists between the two neighbors, however.

India occupies a central position in the Indian Ocean, as its Southern peninsula protrudes approximately seven hundred miles into the northern Indian Ocean. The fact that



India possesses 2,759 miles of coastline, partially indicates its dependence upon the sea. This dependence manifests itself in the form of trade, as a huge population, wealth of raw materials and central position are basic ingredients for a thriving trade in both easterly and westerly directions. Panikkar argues that India's extensive coast makes it vulnerable to domination from the sea by any state controlling the Indian Ocean. He believes that India must develop as a naval power in order to protect its national interests. Such development must be long term, for achieving naval strength requires industrial strength and scientific and technological advancement, areas in which India is making progress but is still relatively weak. Panikkar further defines what India's naval objectives and policies should be and provides a methodology for attaining naval power.<sup>29</sup> Such efforts to date have been fairly successful as the Indian navy is the strongest of any Indian Ocean state. When viewed in conjunction with its army and air forces, India's strength is even more impressive. India's recent victory over Pakistan has served to enhance the stature of its military strength.

India's national security concerns tend to be directed landward, as wars with Pakistan and a confrontation with China attest. Yet historically India has been susceptible

to attack by external powers from the sea. India wants to be able to insure the defense of its territorial waters and prevent any single power from dominating the Indian Ocean. Thus India views the Soviet naval presence as having a neutralizing effect on any United States, British, or future Chinese presence.<sup>30</sup>

Pakistan has been equally occupied with Indian matters. Pakistan views a strong Indian navy as directed at it, not at a potential Chinese threat. She would welcome an increased Indonesian, Australian, and Iranian naval presence in the Indian Ocean as a counterbalance to India's navy.<sup>31</sup> Pakistan has also worked to obtain closer relations with other Muslim states throughout the area. It is presently preoccupied with settling domestic and regional issues, many of which were severely strained by the recent war with India.

#### Eastern Indian Ocean Region.

General Description. Of primary interest are the strategically important access points (the Straits of Malacca, Sunda and Lombok), regional stability, and Chinese and Japanese plans for the area.

Certainly from a strategic viewpoint, freedom of shipping through the straits is most important. If the straits were controlled, or perhaps blocked, the primary alternative route would be around Australia, a journey which would add

many days and miles to vessels transiting between Japan and the Northern or Western Indian Ocean Regions. Furthermore, any limitation or hindrance of passage through these straits by a particular state would be a threat to Japanese and Western industries and most likely result in direct confrontations. The Strait of Malacca is the predominant passageway, accommodating 98 percent of the shipping which transits between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.<sup>32</sup> All but the largest supertankers, which must transit via the Lombok and Makassar Straits, can use this passageway.

Periodic instabilities have characterized the region since World War II. Specific examples are the lengthy war in Malaysia in the fifties between Britain and Communist infiltrators, fighting between Indonesia and the Netherlands over New Guinea, the Indonesian uprising and violence in 1965 resulting from an attempted Communist take over, and periodic frictions between Indonesia and Malaysia. Certainly spillover effects from the war in Vietnam have not aided efforts to achieve regional stability.

The last factor is the future role of Japan and China in this area. Japan has achieved tremendous economic growth since World War II, is currently the third most powerful economic nation in the world, is vitally dependent upon many resources from the Eastern region of the Indian Ocean and envisions this area as an expanding market for its manufactured



goods. China is more of a mystery, and its exact role or intended involvement in the affairs of this region are not perfectly clear. However, China does envision herself as a world power, possesses an ever increasing nuclear capability, has exported and supported insurgency efforts when deemed potentially beneficial and considers the region most important as it relates to China's national security. Speculation about specific intentions will not be attempted, but the future moves of China and Japan will definitely influence events throughout the Eastern Indian Ocean.

Development Status. The Eastern Indian Ocean region is most impressive in terms of size and distance, the areas of the countries exceeding 4.2 million square miles, and the distance from Rangoon, Burma, to Perth, Australia, nearly 3,400 nautical miles. All the countries are considered underdeveloped, with the exception of Australia. Yet the region possesses a wealth of raw materials, ranging from rubber in Malaysia, to oil in Indonesia and iron ore in Australia. Singapore is a major shipping terminal, offering services and facilities to the hundreds of vessels which pass through the Strait of Malacca. Tables XVII and XVIII offer a composite picture of the present status of the nations comprising the Eastern region.

Marine Orientation. With a few exceptions, the words "promising developments" best describe marine activities of the Eastern region states. All the nations are involved in fishing, most in offshore mining and a few are promoting marine science research efforts.

Fishing is the dominant marine activity, with Thailand and Burma producing the largest catches. Thailand caught 1.6 million tons in 1970, but only about twenty percent of its catch occurred in the Indian Ocean. The same trend is true for Indonesia, whose 1966 catch totaled 750,000 tons, but only 144,000 tons was netted in the Indian Ocean.<sup>33</sup> Australia's fishing industry has concentrated on the more valuable fisheries, particularly crayfish; and its 1966 output, valued at 46.4 million dollars, is expected to reach eighty million dollars in 1975.<sup>34</sup> Malaysia's fishing industry is receiving development assistance from Japan and Thailand.

Few offshore minerals have been discovered or exploited off the western coasts of the Eastern area nations. Most favorable potential may belong to Thailand, whose offshore tin mining operations are growing, with increasing attention directed toward the western coast of its peninsula territory.<sup>35</sup> Indonesia, Australia, and Malaysia are increasing their mineral exploration efforts, but very few potential deposits have been located off their western coasts.

Singapore is the fifth largest port in the world, as measured by tonnage handled, and possesses an excellent ship-building and repair industry. The facilities supporting shipping activities are being modernized and expanded, to maintain pace with increasing business.

Burma, Thailand and Malaysia have extensive continental shelves, averaging more than fifty nautical miles in width, and often exceeding one hundred nautical miles off Burma. Indonesia's western and southern shelves are generally narrow, often less than twenty nautical miles wide. Australia's western shelf is not wide, perhaps averaging thirty nautical miles; but its northwestern shelf is very impressive, quickly increasing from about thirty to one hundred nautical miles as it proceeds northeast.

Indonesia claims an archipelago theory by which all waters enclosed by straight baselines joining the outer promontories of the outer islands are considered internal waters. Its claim of a twelve mile territorial sea is then measured outward from those baselines.<sup>36</sup> The Indonesian government has stated that innocent passage through its territorial waters will be permitted, but that prior permission will be required to obtain passage through inland waters.

The result is that Indonesia claims the right to control all shipping movements through this vast expanse of water, including the associated straits. Although this doctrine is



still proclaimed, the volume of commercial shipping does not make enforcement practicable, and the existing government attitude has not threatened free passage. However, foreign warships must provide advance notice and receive Indonesian approval to transit internal waters.<sup>37</sup>

Mutual Relations. Historically, most of the states of the region have been Pacific oriented, with the Indian Ocean attracting relatively little and infrequent attention. Perhaps a time evolved acceptance of British reign in the Indian Ocean coupled with no threat from the west fostered a lack of concern and interest in that area. The decision by Britain to terminate most of its defense commitments east of Suez by the end of 1971 served as a catalyst to create a political pact between Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore, which is intended to act as a stabilizing influence in the region. The stated purpose of the pact is that the governments of the participating states will consult on what action to take in the event of an external attack. Combinations of British, Australian, and New Zealand naval, air and troop forces based in Singapore and Malaysian territory, joint training operations and the formation of a Joint Consultation Council to meet regularly are planned. Although the vagueness of the organization's purpose makes its potential effectiveness suspect, the actual

substance of the pact is a step towards increased regional cooperation.<sup>38</sup>

Of the remaining nations in the Eastern Indian Ocean region, only Indonesia appears to have the interest or capability to be a factor for consideration. Thailand is almost totally dedicated to a Pacific posture, both economically and politically. Burma has never revealed a serious interest in seapower, and its use of the Indian Ocean has primarily been fishing. Conversely, Indonesia has one of the few sizable navies of the states bordering the Indian Ocean. It is primarily composed of Soviet warships received in the early sixties. The termination of relations with Communist countries in 1965 caused severe parts and upkeep problems, resulting in a limited operational capability today.<sup>39</sup> Indonesia possesses a wealth of resources, comprising a whole spectrum of mineral and agricultural goods. Although primarily oriented to the north, Indonesia's wealth and geographical position, which encompasses the whole central portion of the Eastern area, identifies it as a key participant in Eastern Indian Ocean matters.

Besides possessing a vast amount of mineral wealth, Australia is the most industrially developed country in the region. Its main dilemma today is to decide the form of its future role in this area: either a "fortress Australia" or "forward defense" posture, with the latter seemingly emerging

as the current favorite.<sup>40</sup> However, the magnitude and format of Australia's involvement in the regional affairs remains to be determined.

A neutral Indian Ocean excluded of foreign naval powers is the desire of most of the states of the Eastern region. However, they also view this desire as idealistic, and recognize the fact that all external powers have established Indian Ocean interests and are likely to maintain a presence to support these interests. Thus a balance of power is seen as necessary to prevent any single power from controlling the Indian Ocean.<sup>41</sup>



## CHAPTER III

### EXTERNAL POWER INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Who are the external powers in the Indian Ocean? I am considering the Soviet Union, United States, Japan, China and a group of western European nations, called the Western European Bloc, as the five external powers that possess visible interests in the Indian Ocean. A nation can express its interests in many ways. Two broad categories can be labeled "word" interests and "action" interests. "Word" interests are those interests which are voiced by a nation as existing, but are not clearly substantiated by evidence. Conversely "action" interests are those which are clearly revealed through some measure of investment, such as economic or military aid, economic, military or political support, or establishment of a military presence. The specific "action" interests displayed by each state/bloc will be delineated and the apparent trends that these interests foretell will be identified.

#### Western Europe Interests in the Indian Ocean.

General. Historically, Western European interest and exploitation, especially by Britain, France, Portugal, and to a lesser extent the Netherlands, Germany and Italy,

dominated the Indian Ocean area until World War II. Even after World War II, when a spirit of nationalism engulfed the entire region, British influence remained as the dominant external presence. Today, as the British withdrawals from Singapore and the Persian Gulf near completion, Britain, France, and Portugal still retain possessions and investments in the Indian Ocean which must be considered. The emphasis has shifted, however, from one predominantly of control and exploitation, to one of partial dependence, protection of investments and normal relations.

Specific. Clearly, insuring a continued sufficient and unhindered supply of oil from the Middle East is the greatest immediate and long-term concern of Western Europe. The yearly rate of increase in the demand for oil in Western Europe exceeded ten percent in 1970.<sup>1</sup> It is estimated that petroleum's share of Western Europe's energy requirements will increase from forty percent in 1970 to sixty percent in 1980.<sup>2</sup> Despite new oil discoveries throughout the world, estimates still place the Middle East oil reserves at sixty to sixty-five percent of the world's total oil reserves. During recent years, Western Europe has obtained about fifty percent of her oil requirements from the Middle East. Although it has purchased nearly an equivalent amount at a lower cost from North Africa, additional dependence upon

this source is considered very risky, particularly when dealing with the unpredictable Libyan regime. Consequently Western Europe must retain access to her relatively stable supply of Middle East oil.

The Western European Bloc is concerned with the Soviet intentions in the Indian Ocean. Much attention is devoted to the following question: does the increased Soviet presence reflect a relatively new naval power expanding her economic and political interests in the Indian Ocean or is a force being developed to threaten Western European interests in the future?

Western European interest in the Indian Ocean also manifests itself in the form of investments. Britain, in particular, during her reign of approximately 140 years in the area made numerous long-term investments. At the beginning of 1971 Britain's investments in Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf region were estimated at seven billion dollars, with yearly imports and exports approximately three billion dollars each.<sup>4</sup> Twenty percent of all the shipping at sea each day is owned by Britain, and an average of twelve British ships transit the Strait of Malacca each day. Residing in many of the littoral states are British citizens, many of which still serve in administrative functions.<sup>5</sup> A number of possessions are retained by the United Kingdom in the Indian Ocean, and consist of the following: British



Indian Ocean Territory, comprised of the Chagos Archipelago, Aldabra, Farquhar and Desroches Islands; and the Seychelles Islands. Although their military involvement in the area declined greatly from 1967 through 1971, Britain owns or utilizes the following defense facilities: air bases--Masirah, in the Arabian Sea southeast of Oman (99 year lease from Oman in 1958); Salalah (western Oman), seldom used; Gan Island, southern extremity of the Maldiv Islands (30 year lease from the Maldives in 1965); Butterworth (north-western Malaysia); naval facilities, access--Simonstown naval base and Durban, South Africa; Mombasa, Kenya; Mauritius (naval communications station plus airport usage through 1974); Malagasy (use of Majunga airfield to conduct surveillance patrols off Mozambique, relating to economic sanctions against Rhodesia); and Fremantle, Australia.<sup>6</sup>

Britain is committed to a more direct presence in the Eastern Indian Ocean region through its involvement in ANZUK. Specifically the British will provide two frigates, patrol aircraft and one troop battalion as its share of the five nation pact. Britain has agreed to keep at least six frigates east of Suez on a continuous basis, and retains access to former bases at Bahrain and Singapore.<sup>7</sup> The British commitment theory at present is that a modest military presence on a continuous basis serves to maintain stability and enhance British prestige, aid commercial ventures,

provide comfort to friends in the area, and permit quick response if necessary. However, opponents of the theory argue that it increases the risk of a progressive entanglement.<sup>8</sup>

French investments, though fewer than Britain's, also exist in the Indian Ocean. France retains the following possessions: Afars and Issas (formerly French Somaliland); Comoro Islands; La Reunion; and the nearly uninhabited Kerguelen, Crozet and Amsterdam Islands. French naval facilities exist at Djibouti (Afars and Issas), La Reunion, and Diego Suarez (Malagasy Republic). Commitments include cooperation with the Malagasy Republic in defense, economic, monetary and financial matters. France also has permission to use other port facilities in Madagascar, and retains approximately 2,500 military personnel plus a small mixture of ships and aircraft in that country. The French appear determined to maintain an interest and presence in the area, in order to protect their investments and commitments if necessary.<sup>9</sup>

Western European colonial empires and the control and exploitation they represented have disappeared in the Indian Ocean. Still their interests remain, generally in an economic and diplomatic vein; but specifically reflected in their dependence on Persian Gulf oil, protection of investments, and concern over Soviet intentions.

## China's Interests.

General. Except for an intermittent naval presence in the Indian Ocean between the twelfth and sixteenth centuries, China has historically shown very little interest in the Indian Ocean. Only since the Communist take over in 1949 has China's influence penetrated the region, and its investments are relatively small when compared to the efforts of the other external powers. Yet China must be considered a formidable external power, if only on a potential basis, because of its great size, its competition in many fields with the Soviet Union, and the problems created by instability, which often accompanies Chinese assistance.

Specific. According to 1968 statistics, less than eight percent of China's foreign trade has been with Indian Ocean states. It has followed a policy of selective foreign aid and trade in this area. More than fifty percent of Chinese aid has gone to Tanzania and Zambia, where it is helping build a railroad from Dar es Salaam into Zambia.<sup>10</sup> The investment has totaled more than four hundred million dollars, since its beginning in 1970. Estimated completion is in 1975, and the railroad will be primarily used to haul Zambia's copper to the port of Dar es Salaam.<sup>11</sup> China has also provided military assistance in the form of training and



equipment to Tanzania's armed forces. Besides providing tanks and patrol boats, it is reported to be planning to give two squadrons of MIG-17 aircraft to Tanzania.<sup>12</sup> Construction of facilities on Zanzibar Island for monitoring missile tests may be in progress.

China has directed its South Asia support to Pakistan, especially since its military confrontation with India in the early sixties. Since 1966, the Chinese have provided tanks, fighter aircraft and, more recently, two or three whiskey class submarines to the Pakistani armed forces.<sup>13</sup>

Although China has not revealed any interest in Middle East oil, it has increased its trade relations with Kuwait, Iraq and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDR of Yemen). China is suspected of being a principal contributor to the liberation movement efforts of PFLOAG, originating in PDR of Yemen but operating in Oman.<sup>14</sup> Similar assistance is or may be provided to the rebels operating in Eritrea in support of their grievance against Ethiopia. Targets of opportunity such as these can be exploited at minimum cost when the potential gain is considered greater than the risk involved.

China has supported the government of Ceylon, but supposedly was rejected in its attempt to obtain base rights at Trincomalee. Except for its use of the facilities at Dar es Salaam, there are no indications that the Chinese have attempted to obtain bases in the Indian Ocean.

China's navy is defense oriented, consisting primarily of patrol and landing craft, torpedo boats, gunboats and minesweepers. It also has about twelve destroyer and destroyer escorts and thirty-three submarines.<sup>15</sup> Rarely have elements of China's navy steamed in the Indian Ocean. Although China's merchant fleet is growing, its total tonnage is less than five percent of Japan's fleet.<sup>16</sup>

Demilitarization of the Indian Ocean to reduce the threat of Soviet encirclement is one of China's interests. A parallel concern is the potential threat posed by United States and Russian ballistic missile submarines in the Indian Ocean.<sup>17</sup>

China can be expected to invest either politically, economically or militarily in those situations which appear most attractive. It will continue to export its influence in an attempt to diffuse Soviet, United States and Japanese influence. Though unable and probably unwilling to compete in the Indian Ocean at a level of magnitude equivalent to Russian or Japanese investments, China will project its presence to the littoral states through selective commitments.

## Japan's Interests.

General. Since the end of World War II, Japan has experienced a phenomenal economic recovery. Its annual growth rate has averaged about thirteen percent, and today it has the third largest gross national product (GNP) in the world. Japan's 1970 GNP was nearly 201 billion dollars and the 1975 GNP estimate is 418 billion dollars. Japan possesses roughly three percent of the world's population, but utilizes 6.2 percent of its imports.<sup>18</sup> In 1969, its volume of imports and exports exceeded four hundred million tons, and is expected to double by 1985. During 1969, twenty-two percent of Japan's imports originated in the Indian Ocean area, while twenty-three percent arrived from Europe. Since the greatest percentage of imports from Europe transit the Indian Ocean, approximately forty percent of Japan's imports travel across that body of water.<sup>19</sup> The preceding statistics vividly demonstrate Japan's emergence as a world power, and identify the nature of its interests in the Indian Ocean area.

Specific. Japan's major interest in the Indian Ocean area is trade, primarily as a source of raw materials for its voracious industries and increasingly as a growing market for its finished products. Oil is its most precious import which transits the Indian Ocean, for about eighty-



eight percent of Japan's imported oil is purchased from the Persian Gulf area. Significant amounts of iron ore, copper, bauxite, nickel, natural gas, cotton, wool and sugar are also purchased from Indian Ocean states. Some critics feel that Japan is exploiting the region by consuming vast quantities of raw materials, selling finished goods back to the area's markets, but not providing the appropriate assistance and development loans to enable local industrial growth.

Japan is not only dependent upon resource acquisition in the region, but it is vitally concerned with unhampered shipping and navigation, both in the ocean and through its access points. The Japanese are sensitive to any potential power shifts in the Indian Ocean region which might disrupt its oil supply. Japan would prefer a broad balance of power throughout the region, rather than dominance by a single nation.<sup>20</sup>

Although Japan's navy includes nearly forty frigates and destroyers and eleven submarines, its mission is primarily territorial defense. Its navy cannot be expected to adequately protect Japan's more distant shipping lanes in a crisis. During the summer of 1969, a few ships of the Japanese Self Defense Force made a goodwill visit to Indian and Australian ports, the first time since World War II that Japanese warships entered the Indian Ocean.<sup>21</sup>

Japan has made sizable business investments in many of the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. Specifically thousands of salesmen, buyers, technicians and engineers are in Africa, where many joint investment ventures have been initiated with African states. The tendency is toward mutual investments, which share the funding and risks, as well as the profits. The reason for this approach is expressed nicely as follows:

Development of Africa's natural resources and launching new manufacturing efforts in the region requires often fantastic investments and assumption of unusual risks involving unstable governments.<sup>22</sup>

Japanese companies have invested in Middle East oil. Eighty percent of the Arabian Oil Company Limited, located in the Neutral Zone between Iraq and Saudi Arabia, is owned by Japanese Petroleum Trading Company. One hundred percent of the Abu Dhabi Oil Company is owned by three Japanese companies, and the Mitsubishi Oil Developing Company is operating in Abu Dhabi.<sup>23</sup>

Automobile manufacturers and mining companies are increasing their activities in Africa. Japan is a likely investor in a planned trans-African highway, which is viewed as a contributor towards an increasing market for Japanese cars and trucks.<sup>24</sup> Improved road facilities will permit more efficient transportation of raw materials from the African interior to the ocean ports.

Japanese fishermen are active participants in the Indian Ocean, competing with the Soviet Union as the two principal external states fishing in that ocean. Japan built a fish processing plant in Mauritius, and fishermen operate extensively in that area. It is also assisting a number of the local states with the development of their fishing industry.

Japan's investment endeavors in Africa have not encountered much resistance. Japan is viewed with less suspicion in Africa, which it never invaded or colonized, than in Southeast Asia. The foreign ministry of Japan is very sensitive to criticism by Black African nations about its volume of trade with South Africa, which totalled 350 million dollars in 1969. In each region, but for different reasons, Japan's approach must be reasonably cautious. The Japanese presence is accepted today, but as Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore stated, "The chapter is closed but not forgotten."<sup>25</sup>

Trade, as shaped by resource acquisition, particularly oil, and markets for products, are the key Japanese interests in the Indian Ocean. A requirement for safe and secure shipping lanes automatically follows, as does concern over any potential imbalance of power which has the capability to threaten free shipping. Japan has much to offer the developing nations of the Indian Ocean, and can be expected to increase its presence throughout most of that area.



## Soviet Union Interests.

General. Of all the big powers, the Soviet Union, through its actions, has probably generated the most attention, concern and speculation about its ultimate intentions in the Indian Ocean. Theories have varied, from one extreme that the U.S.S.R. is merely a major power with a large and modern navy projecting this navy throughout the oceans of the world, to the other extreme which hypothesizes the U.S.S.R.'s interest in eventual conquest and control of the Persian Gulf oil supplies. A brief review of certain Soviet capabilities, identified by recent trends and events, is presented as a starting point before discussing specific Russian interests.

The Soviet Navy has experienced tremendous growth during the past ten years. Two features of the Russian navy are most impressive. The first is the improvement in quality and capability of the Soviet submarine force, which has remained nearly constant in quantity, 350 to 400 boats. Today the Russians have approximately ninety nuclear submarines, including forty ballistic missile boats of the "Yankee" class either operational or under construction. The U.S.S.R. also has approximately sixty-four cruise missile submarines which pose a formidable threat to surface ships.<sup>26</sup> This surface-to-surface cruise missile capability possessed by Soviet

surface and subsurface ships, is the other very significant feature of Russian naval quality. The Soviet navy is a modern, powerful force capable of numerous alternative uses.

Equally impressive has been the growth of the Soviet merchant fleet, which has grown from 1.9 million tons in 1950 to fourteen million tons in 1970, and is programmed to reach twenty million tons by 1980.<sup>27</sup> Similar rates of growth have characterized the Russian oceanographic and fishing fleets, which included two hundred and four thousand ships respectively in 1970.<sup>28</sup> Expanded use of these maritime capabilities requires a variety of support facilities throughout the world.

In January 1968, Britain announced the planned withdrawal of its military forces east of Suez by the end of 1971. Shortly after the British statement, Soviet naval vessels commenced operating in the Indian Ocean. Since March 1968, the Russian navy has maintained nearly a continuous presence, primarily in the western, northwestern and northern areas of the Indian Ocean. The force is usually mixed, ranging from five to twenty naval ships, and averaging about ten vessels. A typical mix consists of one missile cruiser, two destroyers, a submarine and a few support and research ships. The key point is that apparently the Soviet Union determined that the British withdrawal afforded Russia a timely opportunity to insert its naval presence

into the Indian Ocean. The extent of the Soviet naval presence is summarized in the 1971-72 edition of Jane's Fighting Ships as follows: ". . . five years ago the USSR had no warships in the Indian Ocean, but today there are a score of surface ships alone, and there is no telling how many Soviet submarines are in the area."<sup>29</sup>

Specific. Much has been written about the Russian interest in Middle East oil. At present the Soviet Union uses domestic supplies to satisfy its oil requirements. Most experts agree that Soviet reserves, estimated at 5,500 million tons in 1968, are sufficient to satisfy all Russian needs through 1980. After 1980, the Soviet need for Middle East oil will likely increase.<sup>30</sup>

The Russians also supply most of Eastern Europe's oil an arrangement which is most satisfactory to the Soviet Union as an available means of applying pressure when necessary. Russia sells oil to Western Europe, which provides a nice flow of money into the Soviet treasury. The Soviet Union has a number of options at this time. It can rely solely on domestic oil reserves, continuing to sell appropriate amounts to Western and Eastern Europe; or increase its purchases of Middle East oil, which would be cheaper to use in western Russia and to sell to Eastern Europe.<sup>31</sup> By using only Soviet oil, Russia minimizes supply and political problems; however,



proper use and exploitation of the cheaper albeit riskier Middle East oil, might prove more profitable in the long run.

Russia already purchases natural gas from Iran. An arrangement was established in 1966, whereby Russia agreed to build a steel mill and pipeline in Iran in return for natural gas from Iran. That year marked the beginning of improved relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, which has been evidenced by increased trade between the two nations and Soviet arms sales to Iran. Perhaps this is another example of Soviet opportunism, for in 1965 the United States declared Iran a developed country, and announced the termination of economic and military aid.<sup>32</sup>

Russia has also been a steady supporter of Iraq. Relations between Iraq and Iran have often been strained, and any serious disagreement between the two countries could make a Soviet decision very difficult. Russia would certainly like to have some control over the distribution of Middle East oil. Such control would enable the Russians to exercise considerable power over Western Europe and Japan, both of which are presently highly dependent upon an uninterrupted flow of Middle East oil.<sup>33</sup> Any attempt to attain control over Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf oil would likely precipitate a direct confrontation with the United States, as well as arouse considerable resentment within the countries involved. Such a venture is far too risky, especially when compared to a "wait

and see" policy which takes advantage of opportunities when they occur.<sup>34</sup>

Russia has devoted most of its Indian Ocean efforts to the Northwest Region of the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval forces have generally operated in the following areas: off the west coast of India, Arabian Sea, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, off the East African Coast, and in the vicinity of Mauritius and the Seychelles Island complexes. During the period March 1968, when the first Soviet warships entered the Indian Ocean, to April 1971, Russian naval units visited twenty different ports in fourteen different nations, a total of more than fifty port visits.<sup>35</sup> Although the number of warships present at any one time varies, the Soviets have maintained an average of ten to twelve ships in the Indian Ocean during the last three years. Occasionally the number has been as great as twenty.

Reasons mentioned for the Soviet naval presence vary extensively, and all may be true to some degree. Certainly the impact of events as they occur in the Indian Ocean, affects interested nations in a variety of ways, and results in a whole range of responses from external states.

The primary task of the Soviet navy is the protection of the national security of the Soviet Union. Consequently Russia will be interested in deploying its navy into any area

where a threat is perceived. Whether or not a fact, if the U.S.S.R. believes that United States ballistic missile submarines are stationed in the Indian Ocean and are a threat to Russia's security, increased naval activity in the area, while perhaps inadequate to counter the threat today, could be the initial thrust for a greater effort in the future. The facts of the matter are that the United States presently operates two communications stations in the Indian Ocean area, which are primarily designed to service nuclear submarines, and is building a third station on Diego Garcia; and much of Soviet and Chinese territory is within range of polaris and poseidon missiles launched from the Indian Ocean.<sup>36</sup> A large number of uses for the Soviet navy can be envisioned in the Indian Ocean. Some of the more frequently mentioned ones are:

- . Counter United States ballistic missile submarine threat
- . Operate and deploy new and modern naval forces in warm weather environment
- . Assist in gathering more information and knowledge about the Indian Ocean (oceanographic, hydrographic efforts)
- . Show the flag among the newer developing nations of Africa and Asia
- . Protect economic and military aid activities throughout the area



- . Achieve greater influence in the Persian Gulf oil activities
- . Support space program activities
- . Protect Soviet fishing fleets
- . Contain China's influence
- . Replace Britain as dominant naval power in area.

This list of interests varies in degree of importance. One can argue that the Soviets decided that British withdrawal coupled with the likelihood of decreasing United States presence in SEA plus the newly realized Soviet ability to project naval strength at a distance provided an opportunity to exploit Russian military and diplomatic efforts throughout the region.

The Soviets have shown an interest in the fishing potential of the Indian Ocean, both through their aid programs and increased fishing fleet activities in those waters. They provided assistance to Pakistan through development of some fishing facilities, specifically at Gwadar, West Pakistan, and also along the Egyptian coast in the Gulf of Suez. The Russians concluded an agreement with Mauritius in July 1970, which authorized port usage for Soviet fishing trawlers and commercial aircraft landing rights to enable crew switches on board the fishing boats. Mauritius is receiving assistance in developing its local fishing industry. Although a sizable amount of significance has been attached to this

agreement concerning its further implications regarding base rights to Soviet warships, the terms apparently limit the Soviets to only fifteen trawler visits per year and no usage of base facilities by Soviet warships.<sup>37</sup> Other reports indicate that the Russians buy oil and supplies in Port Louis, Mauritius, for their naval forces. Similar conflicting reports occur in many of the articles discussing Soviet Indian Ocean rights.

The Soviets have also installed mooring buoys to serve as anchorages in the following Indian Ocean locations: off Mauritius, off the Seychelles, southwest of Malagasy, near the St. Brandon Island group, Cargado Island, off Diego Garcia and in the Mozambique channel. Such anchorages readily serve as floating bases, functioning as rendezvous points for replenishment and repair operations.<sup>38</sup> Mooring buoys enable the Soviet fleet and other vessels to operate in a deployed mode for extensive periods of time and not require permanent regional base support.

Since the Arab-Israeli conflict in June 1967, the Russians have provided the greatest proportion of the economic and military aid received by the United Arab Republic, and have also increased their aid efforts in Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, PDR of Yemen, Iraq, Iran, Pakistan and India.

The Soviet military aid to Somalia has been fairly extensive, most of it supporting the army with training and

equipment, the air force with MIG-15s and 17s, about twelve, and roughly 325 advisors. Additional aid has been given towards the expansion and modernization of the two Somali ports of Berbera and Mogadishu. Specifically, the Soviets are building two 4,000 foot piers and a radio station at Berbera. The Somali armed forces appear to be as dependent upon Soviet advice and equipment as the armed forces of Ethiopia are upon United States aid.<sup>39</sup>

Soviet relations with Ethiopia improved during 1970, as Emperor Haille Selassie visited Russia and Soviet warships were invited to Massawa, Ethiopia, for a port visit. Russia has provided Ethiopia with economic assistance.

The Russians have invested various amounts in Yemen and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen during the last five years. Improved facilities were constructed by Soviet engineers at the port of Hodeida, Yemen, and a significant amount of aid was provided in the past. During recent years, however, Soviet influence has decreased while Western influence has increased, perhaps a result of closer relations between Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Soviet influence has encountered similar problems in the PDR of Yemen, as Chinese efforts have tended to diffuse Soviet influence. The Russians can use the ports of Hodeida and Aden to service their ships, but neither country is a Soviet dependent.<sup>40</sup>



Another subject of ambiguous reporting is Socotra Island, which guards the entrance to the Gulf of Aden and is owned by the PDR of Yemen. The Russians supposedly received permission to build an air base and communications station on the island in 1970. Allegedly they used it as a troop landing area during recent exercises, moor ships at the two available anchorages, and have not used the island. The Soviets have probably used Socotra's anchorage areas, but the other contentions have not been verified.

The Russians provided increased aid to Pakistan in the sixties and early seventies. Most of the aid was oriented toward heavy industry and oil exploration. Specifically, credit for a one million ton steel mill in Karachi was provided, a modern road connecting West Pakistan with Russia (via Afghanistan) was completed in July 1970, and some military aid was included. The Soviets probably hope to counter part of China's influence with the Pakistan government, and obtain the use of port facilities for fleet support.<sup>41</sup>

Whether or not the Soviets have base rights in India seems to be an ever popular topic. India has consistently stated that Vishakhapatnam, the base of interest on the Bay of Bengal, is not a Soviet base. The Soviets do use various Indian bases for replenishment of stores and provisions, and crew rest and relaxation, as do ships of other nations. Nationalism is a powerful force in India, and probably would

cause the removal of any government that permitted the establishment of foreign bases on Indian territory.<sup>42</sup>

Russia gave India four conventional attack submarines, foxtrot designation, five destroyer escorts, six missile patrol boats and a number of landing craft and auxiliaries. The Soviets also provide a sizable amount of economic aid to India. Perhaps the fact that Russia and India concluded a Twenty Year Friendship and Co-operation Treaty in August 1971, best illustrates Soviet/India relations. A recent article stated:

Russia's presence in the Indian Ocean is expected to grow steadily with Indian help. Some experts are convinced that the Indo-Soviet mutual assistance treaty includes secret clauses providing for Soviet naval bases in India, although there is no physical evidence of this as yet. Russian naval ships visiting India normally anchor offshore, instead of tying up at docks.<sup>43</sup>

Thus Soviet interests in the Indian Ocean are a mixture of various forms of military and economic aid to many of the littoral states, a sizable naval presence and associated port visits, support for Egypt in her confrontation with Israel, numerous fishing vessels and increased investment in Middle East oil. A variety of Soviet objectives likely exists in the Indian Ocean, but perhaps a partial answer is provided by the statement of Mr. Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, on 27 June 1968, which reads:

Equal rights at all sectors and in all spheres of activity in the international area, including the adoption of measures to protect the vital

interests of the Soviet Union, its allies and friends; no discrimination in world trade; extensive exchange of scientific, technological and cultural values; freedom of navigation for our ships and fleets, no less than for the ships and fleets of any other power--all this determines our possibilities and responsibilities in world affairs.<sup>44</sup>

### United States Interests.

General. United States interests in the Indian Ocean have generally been secondary interests, especially when compared with U.S. interests in the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Before the mid-1960s, rarely was the Indian Ocean discussed in American periodicals or books. Primary reasons for the negligible U.S. interests are:

- . Geographical separation between the United States and the Indian Ocean
- . No American colonization efforts in the Indian Ocean area
- . Implicit acceptance of British domination throughout the area prior to World War II
- . United States military operations during World War II were almost completely in the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and nearly nonexistent in the Indian Ocean
- . Subsequent conflicts, tensions and crisis involving the United States have primarily occurred outside the Indian Ocean



- . American trade is mainly with European countries and Southeast Asia, namely Japan
- . No Indian Ocean state or force therein has posed a serious threat to the security of the United States.

Since 1967, numerous articles have been written about the Indian Ocean and conferences have addressed the various events occurring therein and their significance to the United States. Similarly a vast number of recommendations have emerged concerning possible courses of action for the United States in the Indian Ocean. Suggestions have ranged from "doing nothing" to maintaining a strong naval presence or fleet in the region. Principal reasons for this sudden attention in the United States were the announced British plans in 1967 of removal of her military forces from the Indian Ocean area coupled with the immediate projection of a Soviet naval presence into the region. These events seemed to be the catalyst which has awakened United States efforts to identify and evaluate its interests in the Indian Ocean, caused much speculation about possible Soviet intentions in that area and suggested that a more definitive United States policy needs to be formulated in order to effectively direct its actions in the Indian Ocean.

United States interests in the Indian Ocean are depicted as follows:

1. Promote peace and stability throughout the area
2. Encourage economic growth in the littoral states
3. Insure that lines of communication and freedom of transportation (shipping) on the seas are not threatened
4. Provide economic and military assistance to specified states
5. Abide by United States commitments which exist in the area
6. Insure protection of U.S. investments, both military and economic, and citizens in the region
7. Seek a settlement to the Arab/Israeli conflict
8. Prevent domination of the region by any single external or internal state
9. Maintain unhindered access to vital raw materials of the region by U.S. allies, primarily Western Europe
10. Seek a reduction in tension and an improvement in relations between India and Pakistan.

Many of these interests are very general and apply to the other areas of the world as well as the Indian Ocean. Other interests are more definitive, and specific U.S. actions can be associated with them. A few of the more specific U.S. interests will be enumerated in the following paragraph.

United States oil companies have developed most of the oil production capability in the Persian Gulf area, and currently possess concession rights to about sixty percent

of the Middle East oil reserves.<sup>45</sup> Economic aid is provided to many of the littoral states, with the largest amounts allotted to Israel, Iran, Pakistan, India, Thailand and Indonesia. Major arms agreements were concluded with Israel, Iran, Pakistan, Thailand and Australia during the years 1966-1970. Military investments exist, primarily in the form of communications stations and a small Middle East Force (MEF). The United States is a party to a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements with particular states in the Indian Ocean. Each of these specific interests will be discussed in greater detail in the following section.

Specific. Oil is probably the most direct United States interest in the Indian Ocean, an interest which materialized in the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf region. American oil interest is not presently that of a consumer, but primarily that of an investor, for the United States only purchases about six percent of its oil from the Middle East. The oil investments, however, provide the United States with about 1.5 billion dollars annually, which helps partially to offset the existing balance of payment deficit.<sup>46</sup>

United States oil companies own sizable percentages of the major Persian Gulf oil producing companies. Table XIX is a summation of the major oil company holdings in this region. The figures reveal that United States companies own



47.5 percent of Iraq Petroleum Company, 49 percent of Iranian Consortium, 100 percent of Arabian American Oil Company and 50 percent of Kuwait Oil Company. The low production costs, high market price in the United States and favorable tax conditions make oil investments most beneficial to the oil companies and the U.S. Government.<sup>47</sup> Thus the immediate interest of oil to the United States is one of investment return.

Since the Middle East possesses approximately sixty-two percent of the world's proven oil reserves, a long-term interest of unrestricted access to this oil also exists. The degree of importance attached to this interest is dependent on U.S. oil policy, domestic oil production and the future exploitation of other oil reserves, such as those in Alaska. Present oil consumption in North America is about sixteen million barrels per day, with an annual growth rate of four percent.<sup>48</sup> A continued rise in consumption, may increase the importance of Middle East oil to the United States consumer in the long run.

An indirect interest to the United States is the aforementioned importance of Middle East oil to the countries of Western Europe and Japan. If this source of oil was lost to them, the economic repercussions would probably be considerable. Depending upon the circumstances surrounding such an interruption, a confrontation of states would likely

occur. As an ally and friend of Japan and Western Europe states, United States involvement would certainly occur.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has consistently provided foreign aid to developing countries. Since 1945, more than twenty billion dollars in foreign grants and credits were dispensed to the littoral states of the Indian Ocean. India and Pakistan received more than twelve billion dollars, while Indonesia, Egypt, Israel, and Iran obtained about one billion dollars each. During the years 1966-1970, the principal recipients of U.S. aid in descending order were: India, Pakistan, Indonesia, Iran, Australia, Thailand, Israel and Jordan.<sup>49</sup>

More specifically, the United States assisted the Somali Republic with improvement of its port facilities at Chisimaio in 1967. However, United States influence in Somalia has declined in recent years, and Peace Corps workers were asked to depart in October 1969.<sup>50</sup> Ethiopia has received continuous aid from the United States, especially in the form of military equipment and advice. Although Iran was declared a developed country in 1964, United States aid resumed in 1965 and totalled 165 million dollars for the years 1969 and 1970. Despite United States support of Israel and condemnation by the UAR, American relations with three Arab states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Jordan remain friendly. The United

States maintains firmly established oil interests in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, while Jordan continuously receives foreign aid. Since the Communist purge in Indonesia in 1965, United States aid to that state has increased each year, amounting to 189 million dollars in 1970.<sup>51</sup>

United States interests are further evident in the form of commitments, primarily those of multilateral and bilateral agreements. Although these commitments vary in scope, they obligate the United States to retain sufficient capabilities to fulfill each agreement.

The specific multilateral agreements are the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Australian, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) treaties, both of indefinite duration but permitting one year's notice of withdrawal, and providing for mutual defense in the event any participant is subject to armed attack.<sup>52</sup> SEATO has grown significantly weaker over time, with France and Pakistan seldom participating in any events. Other members are Britain, Australia, Thailand, New Zealand and the Philippines. The United States is an active participant in SEATO exercises, although fewer were conducted during recent years.

Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), which consists of Turkey, Britain, Iran and Pakistan, is renewed every five years and requires six months notice of withdrawal. The members pledged mutual cooperation for security and defense



against direct or indirect aggression. The United States is not a member of CENTO, but serves as an advisor, and occasionally participates in naval exercises, particularly with Iran and Britain.

Principal bilateral agreements involve the United States with Ethiopia, Australia, Thailand and Britain. Particulars of each pact are as follows: a defense assistance agreement with Ethiopia, in effect until 1978, and permitting operation of a communications station at Asmara; establishment of a communications station at North West Cape, Australia, through 1988; a fifty year agreement with Britain, signed in 1966, which provides for joint use of British Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT) for defense purposes; and an indefinite pact with Thailand, reaffirming "the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to U.S. national interests and to world peace."<sup>53</sup>

In early April 1971, a United States Naval Construction Battalion Detachment arrived at Diego Garcia, a small fourteen by five mile atoll which is part of the Chagos Archipelago. The island is located about one thousand miles south, southwest of the southern tip of India and two thousand miles northeast of Madagascar. The stated purpose, according to naval sources, for the construction force on Diego Garcia is to build "a communications relay station, with an airfield to make it accessible."<sup>54</sup> Estimated cost of the project,

which should be completed by 1974, is nineteen million dollars. The station will increase communications coverage in an area of the world where the United States has a relatively limited capability. It will also serve as a back-up station to the existing U.S. Kagnew Communications Station located at Asmara, Ethiopia, which serves as a global relay and intelligence listening post. The United States also manns a very low frequency communications station at North West Cape, Australia, the primary purpose of which is to support U.S. submarines.<sup>55</sup> When it becomes operational, the Diego Garcia station will be manned by a joint United States/British team, primarily U.S. Navy personnel, totaling about 250 persons. Both U.S. and British flags will fly over the station, which will probably be commanded by a U.S. naval officer.

The construction of this "austere communications facility," by which it is usually referred, is the result of a U.S./British agreement signed in 1966 and extending for fifty years.

Present support facilities at the atoll are very limited. When completed, the runway will be eight thousand feet long and able to accommodate most U.S. aircraft. Port facilities are practically nonexistent, with no berthing capability for ships. Consequently most supplies will have to be delivered by air. Some fuel storage facilities are planned, with connections being installed to permit aviation fuel and fuel oil for ships to be pumped ashore.<sup>56</sup>

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the investment at Diego Garcia is its potential for the future. It is centrally located in the Indian Ocean, at distances within reach of many African, Asian, and Australian airfields. Apparently the atoll's inlet could be developed through dredging to provide fifty square miles of anchorage space.<sup>57</sup>

Since 1948, the United States has maintained a Middle East Force (MEF), designated MIDEASTFOR, at the British port facilities in Bahrain. The force consists of a converted seaplane tender, U.S.S. Valcour (AGF-1), and two destroyers. This force represents the total permanent U.S. naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Over the years the MEF has made hundreds of port visits to eastern Africa and South Asia states. It has regularly participated in CENTO exercises with Britain and Iran. Its primary purpose is to maintain a low level U.S. presence throughout the region, essentially serving as a stabilizing force. More specifically, the main functions of the MEF are: "Showing the flag; protection and assistance of U.S. merchant shipping and maintenance of free passage in international waterways; evacuation operations; administration of military assistance programs; and communications and intelligence activities."<sup>58</sup>

From a military capability viewpoint, the MEF is very limited. It perhaps serves as a partial deterrent, but certainly would not hinder any sizable force it might encounter.



The MEF has represented the United States in the Persian Gulf and adjacent areas for the last twenty-four years. It does represent a visible U.S. presence, admittedly small; and reveals to the states of that area a continuing American presence. Whether or not the MEF should be enlarged, modernized, relocated, removed or left as is, are options which must be addressed in light of the changing situation which presently exists in the Indian Ocean.

Since early 1971, United States naval involvement in the Indian Ocean has increased. Beginning in March, construction work, previously described, began on the communications station at Diego Garcia. In April 1971, four days of antisubmarine warfare exercises were conducted in the southeastern Indian Ocean by six ships, four destroyers, a submarine and the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Ticonderoga (CVS-14).<sup>59</sup> From 10 July to 22 July 1971, the U.S.S. Truxtun (DLGN-35), a nuclear-powered frigate, conducted a twelve day, eight thousand mile journey throughout the Indian Ocean. The ship departed Subic Bay in the Philippines, transited the Strait of Malacca, and followed a track toward the Maldive Islands, around the Seychelles Island group and terminated at Perth, Australia. The average speed of the ship was about thirty knots, and demonstrated the ability of a nuclear-powered ship to cover great distances at high speeds.<sup>60</sup> In September, the nuclear carrier U.S.S. Enterprise (CVAN-65)

and nuclear frigate U.S.S. Bainbridge (DLGN-25) conducted a four day cruise in the Andaman Sea. Prime Minister McMahon announced in November that he had been informed by Secretary of Defense Laird that U.S. naval forces would conduct intermittent cruises in the Indian Ocean to "counter-balance" Soviet naval power therein. Mr. McMahon said that,

United States ships and planes would be welcome to use the repair and refueling facilities at the Cockburn Sound Naval Base and Learmonth Air Station in Western Australia.<sup>61</sup>

From 14 December 1971, to 10 January 1972, the navy operated a nine ship task force in the north central Indian Ocean. The purpose of the task force operation was related to the India/Pakistan conflict, and will be discussed in the following section.

The United States Navy intends to modernize the Middle East Force, stationed in Bahrain, by replacing the aged flagship Valcour with the U.S.S. LaSalle (LPD-3), an amphibious transport ship. While not increasing the size of the force, the LaSalle provides an increased capability to the MEF, particularly in amphibious warfare. Similarly the United States concluded an executive agreement with Bahrain on 23 December 1971, permitting the MEF to continue using some of the facilities of the former British base in Bahrain.<sup>62</sup>

The general trend portrayed by these events and reiterated by government spokesmen is that the United States will

not maintain a sizable permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean, but rather conduct more frequent operations and port visits in the area by navy ships. Such operations will reaffirm U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean area, but at a low level not to inconvenience or antagonize the littoral states.<sup>63</sup>



## CHAPTER IV

### POTENTIAL UNITED STATES/SOVIET UNION CONFRONTATIONS

The potential for external power confrontations does exist in the Indian Ocean. The interests of each of the external power states were previously described. Many of these interests interact and overlap with one another. Although each encounter cannot be identified, three modes of confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union will be discussed. The first involves economic and political competition via aid and assistance programs, the second reveals the effects of an internal event, and the third summarizes strategic competition between the two superpowers.

Aid and Assistance Competition. United States and Soviet assistance programs in the Indian Ocean during recent years have confronted each other in a number of instances. The most obvious example is Soviet aid to the Arab states (primarily Egypt) and United States assistance to Israel. Since the six day war in June 1967, Russia and the United States have provided substantial amounts of military assistance to their respective benefactors. Although no subsequent war has occurred, a number of skirmishes have been fought, the tension between the participants has not been reduced, and efforts to secure a peaceful settlement have not been successful.

During recent years, Russian aid to Somalia increased, while United States assistance decreased. Each state assisted Somalia with improvements to its port facilities, the United States in Chisimaio and the Soviets in Berbera and Mogadishu. The United States Peace Corp was asked to leave in 1969. Soviet military personnel are now advising and materially supporting Somali military forces. Soviet influence is presently at a relatively high level compared to United States influence.

Since 1970, Russian and Ethiopian relations have improved. Soviet aid was offered and accepted by Ethiopia. The United States has provided aid to Ethiopia since the early 1950s and the Ethiopian military forces receive equipment and advice from the United States. Ethiopian and American relations are still very good.

A similar situation exists in Iran, where Soviet aid and assistance was initiated in 1966. United States aid was reduced in the middle 1960s especially when the United States declared that Iran was now considered a developed country. As noted, Soviet aid was immediately forthcoming and subsequently U.S. aid resumed and has increased continually since 1967.

Soviet and United States competition also exists in India and Pakistan. Prior to the India/Pakistan war in December 1971, the United States was supplying Pakistan with economic

and military aid while giving economic aid to India but rejecting its plea for military aid.<sup>1</sup> Russia was happy to supply India with military aid, and is assisting India in modernizing its navy and port facilities. The Soviets have also provided assistance to Pakistan.

Briefly summarizing, the aid competition between the United States and Russia in the Indian Ocean primarily exists in the Northwest, Arabian Sea/Persian Gulf and Northern Indian Ocean regions. Soviet aid is the newer input in most states, and Russian influence seems to have benefited from these investments. United States influence has not suffered much in states such as Ethiopia and Iran, but it has decreased relative to the Soviet position in India. The Arab/Israeli confrontation remains the most sensitive situation in the area. Neither side is amenable to a settlement except on its own terms. Since the United States and Soviet Union back opposite sides, continuous tension between the principal parties affords an ever present opportunity for an United States/Soviet encounter.

Internal Event Effects. During the India/Pakistan war in December 1971, the United States and Soviet Union supported opposite sides. During the buildup phase preceding the war, the United States provided arms to Pakistan while Russia greatly increased its supply of military equipment



to India. On 13 December 1971, the United States sent a nine ship task force from the South China Sea toward the Indian Ocean. The force consisted of the aircraft carrier Enterprise, amphibious assault ship U.S.S. Tripoli (LPH-10) and a few guided missile destroyers and support ships. The task force entered the Bay of Bengal on 15 December, and proceeded northwest toward East Pakistan. The purpose for sending the task force into the Indian Ocean was never clearly revealed, although the State Department said that the ships were prepared to evacuate American citizens in East Pakistan if such action became necessary.<sup>2</sup> Few people really accepted this explanation as the sole reason for sending the force into the Indian Ocean. Further explanations were not provided, but through a combination of sketchy press releases, individual leaks to columnists, deduction, and speculation, the following consensus about the purposes for the task force evolved:

- 1) To serve as a deterrent to any further military plans against West Pakistan by forcing India to divert ships and planes away from military operations
- 2) To demonstrate United States strength and flexibility to both Russia and India
- 3) To serve as a response to the existing and increasing Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean
- 4) To evacuate United States citizens in Pakistan if required.<sup>3</sup>

The Soviet naval presence reportedly consisted of sixteen ships in the Indian Ocean when the war started, and increased to about twenty-two ships when the U.S. task force entered the area.<sup>67</sup> Thus the potential for confrontation between the United States and Soviet Union certainly existed in the Indian Ocean, as naval forces of each country maneuvered in a sensitive area of conflict between two littoral states.

China also supported Pakistan in its war with India. Talk of diversionary moves, by China to decrease Indian pressure on Pakistan, and by Russia to offset any move by China, reemphasized the disagreements and potential border clashes between those states.

The U.S. task force, which remained south of India during most of its Indian Ocean assignment, departed the area on 10 January 1972. An estimated fifteen to twenty Soviet ships were still in the Indian Ocean at that time.<sup>5</sup>

Who won the battle for influence? India won the war, and as the supporter of India, the Soviet Union will probably benefit from its role. The Russians will likely receive increased Indian support for their Indian Ocean presence. Russia can also expect preferred treatment at Indian naval facilities for support of its ships.<sup>6</sup> The Soviet Union increased its prestige in many of the littoral states, thereby strengthening its ability to limit and counter any Chinese overtures in the Indian Ocean.

United States influence suffered, but only the future will permit an accurate assessment of the effect upon American influence. Perhaps the setback is a blessing to the United States, for it may initiate a thorough analysis of American interests in the Indian Ocean and result in the formulation of a definitive Indian Ocean policy.

Strategic Footholds. It was previously mentioned that the Indian Ocean has received increased attention since 1968 because of two events: announced British withdrawal from east of Suez and introduction of Soviet naval activity into the area in 1968. Soviet and U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean were depicted. From a geographical point of view, the Indian Ocean is a greater national security interest to the Soviet Union than to the United States. United States ballistic missile submarines can launch missiles against both Russian and Chinese territory from the Indian Ocean. Conversely, Soviet forces in the Indian Ocean are not a direct threat to U.S. territory, but rather a potential threat to various American interests therein.

The United States maintains a low level military presence in the Indian Ocean. The MEF conducts numerous port visits, participates in joint exercises with other naval forces in the area and is accepted throughout the area by most of the littoral states.



The United States also possesses two communications facilities in the area and is building a third. U.S. forces can use base facilities in Australia and South Africa, and repair and replenishment facilities in Singapore. Lesser port facilities are available throughout the Indian Ocean to U.S. ships for replenishment and port visits. Recent statements by Defense Department spokesmen indicate that navy ships will operate more frequently in the Indian Ocean in the future.<sup>7</sup>

The United States naval pattern in the Indian Ocean appears to be as follows: establish the necessary facilities in the area to support periodic naval operations; minimize the offensiveness of these facilities to the littoral states; and conduct more frequent naval activities in the Indian Ocean to reaffirm United States interests therein.

Increased attention to the Indian Ocean area by the Soviet Union, demonstrated by the visible presence of the Soviet Navy, has introduced a new variable into the Indian Ocean. Reduction of British forces in the Indian Ocean has focused attention upon the Soviet presence. Particularly important to the United States are the capabilities and intentions which are represented by this new variable, and their effect in the future on U.S. interests.

Although varying in size, the Soviet Union maintains a year-round naval presence in the Indian Ocean. Fishing,

oceanographic, space tracking and combat vessels represent the Russians throughout the area. Soviet ships use numerous port facilities in the Indian Ocean, particularly those in the northwest and northern regions. The Russians anchored mooring buoys at various locations in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union is expected to continue its efforts to obtain air and naval facilities in various countries such as Somalia, PDR of Yemen, India, Ceylon and Bangladesh. As the Russians continue their naval programs in the Indian Ocean and the United States increases its activities, the likelihood of an encounter increases.

The United States and Soviet Union both possess specific interests in the Indian Ocean. A variety of methods is employed by each nation in support of its interests. As both states pursue their respective interests, the potential for confrontation increases. Although confrontations will occur, conflicts need not necessarily follow. The pattern at present appears as follows: the Soviet Union seeks to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean while the United States strives for a capability therein.

The United States needs to analyze the interests, investments and operating methods of itself and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean area. The magnitude and purpose of current U.S. efforts in the Indian Ocean must be evaluated. The analysis must identify existing or developing

trends which are likely to cause confrontations between the two countries. A clear, definitive U.S. policy, which enunciates U.S. interests in the Indian Ocean, must be formulated. Only then can courses of action, which effectively utilize American resources, be pursued to achieve U.S. objectives in the Indian Ocean.



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Present Tire	LF	/32	LR	/32	RF	/32	RR	/32	S	/32
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STOCK NO.	QUAN.	SIZE-DESCRIPTION	PRICE	AMT SALE (CASH PRICE)
38417	②	E78x1435w		
		<i>Sub Total</i>		4190
	②	<i>Feind</i>		468
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APPENDIX I

TABLES



TABLE I

LOCATION, DESCRIPTION AND STATUS OF PRINCIPAL INDIAN  
OCEAN ISLANDS/ISLAND GROUPS

Name	Location	Population	Area/Number (mi) <sup>2</sup> #	Status
Malagasy Republic	250 nm east of Mozambique, Africa	6,500,000	226,657/1	Independent
Mauritius	480 nm east of Malagasy Republic	800,000	720/1	Independent
La Reunion	120 nm WSW of Mauritius	457,000	90/1	French Control
Comoros Islands	Between northern tip Madagascar and Africa	253,000	90/	French Control
Seychelles Islands	900 nm north of Mauritius	58,000	100/89	British Control
Chagos Archipelago	1000 nm south of India	1,400	175/	British Control
Maldiv Islands	400 nm SW of Ceylon	106,000	115/1087	Independent
Laccadive Islands	200 nm west of southern India		/19	Indian Control
Socotra	120 nm ENE of NE coast of Somalia		1400/1	PDR of Yemen
Ceylon	50 nm SE of southern tip of India	11,200,000	25,332/1	Independent
Andamen Islands	325 nm SW of Rangoon			Indian Control
Nicobar Islands	180 nm NW of Sumatra			Indian Control
Cocos Islands	1700 nm NW of Perth		/14	Australian Control

Source: Nation Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World (Washington: 1970), v.p.

TABLE II

## PRINCIPAL STRAITS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Name	Perimeter States	Location	Minimum Width (nm)	Minimum Depth (ft)
Bab el Mendebeh	France/Yemen	South Entrance to Red Sea	14	18
St. of Hormuz	Iran/Oman	Entrance to Persian Gulf	21	54
St. of Malacca	Indonesia/Malaysia	Between Malaysia and Sumatra	8	15
Sunda Strait	Indonesia	Between Java and Sumatra	12	18
Lombok Strait	Indonesia	Between Bali and Lombok	11	600

Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1969), p. 26, 27.

TABLE III

GEOGRAPHICAL REGIONS AND RELATED PRIMARY  
INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

Region	Composition	Primary Interests
Western Indian Ocean	South Africa	Economic Development
	Mozambique	South Africa
	Tanzania	Cape of Good Hope
	Malagasy Republic	Island Bases
	Mauritius	
	Kenya	
	Seychelles Islands	
	Comoros Islands	
	La Reunion	
	BIOT (Islands)	
Northwest Indian Ocean	Somali Republic	Israel/Arab Conflict
		Suez Canal
	Ethiopia	
	Affars and Issas Territory	
	Sudan	
	Egypt	
	Israel	
	Jordan	
Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf	Saudi Arabia	Oil
	Yemen	
	Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen	
	Oman	
	Union of Arab Emirates	
	Bahrain	
	Qatar	
	Kuwait	
	Iraq	
	Iran	
Northern Indian Ocean	Pakistan	Pakistan/India Relations
	India	
	Ceylon	
	Maldives	
	Laccadive, Andaman and Nicobar Island Groups	



Region	Composition	Primary Interests
Eastern Indian Ocean	Burma	Pacific/Indian Ocean Passageways China and Japan Regional stability
	Thailand	
	Malaysia	
	Singapore	
	Indonesia	
	Australia	
	New Zealand	
	Cocos and	

TABLE IV

## WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION INFORMATION

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
So. Africa	19,167,000	471,443	Pretoria	Mining (Gold) Industry Wool	Republic	Britain
Mozambique	7,100,000	302,328	Lorenzo Marques	Shipping	Portuguese Overseas Territory	Portugal
Tanzania	13,200,000	362,151	Dar es Salaam	Sisal Cloves Mining	Republic	Britain Germany (Commonwealth)
Kenya	10,900,000	224,959	Nairobi	Coffee Tea Sisal Lt. Indus.	Republic	Britain (Commonwealth)
Madagascar	6,900,000	226,657	Tananarive	Farming Herding Coffee Vanilla	Republic	France Britain
Mauritius	810,000	720	Pt. Louis	Sugar	Republic	Britain France (Commonwealth)

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
Seychelles Is.	58,000	--	Victoria (Mohe Island)	Copra Cinnamon Vanilla	British Crown Colony	Britain
Comoro Is.	253,000	838	Moroni	Various oils	French Overseas Territory-- Limited Self Govern- ment	France
La Reunion	457,000	90	St. Denis	Perfume oils	French Overseas Territory	France
BIOT	1,400 (seasonal)	175	--		British Crown Colony	Britain

Source: National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World  
(Washington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.



TABLE V

## OCEAN ORIENTATION OF THE WESTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
So. Africa	6	748	Cape Town Port Elizabeth East London Durban	Fishing Mar. Sci. Mining (Diamonds)	1 Sub 8 DL/DD Coastal Type (16)	Bombers (31) Fighters (40)
Mozambique	-	1352	Lorenco Marques Beira	Fishing <sup>a</sup> Mar. Sci.	Unk.	Unk.
Tanzania	12	669	Dar es Salaam Zanzibar	Fishing <sup>a</sup> Mar. Sci. <sup>b</sup>	13 Patrol Boats	Noncombat
Kenya	12	247	Mombassa	Fishing <sup>a</sup>	4 Patrol Boats	6 Fighter Bombers
Malagasy Republic	12	2155		Fishing <sup>a</sup>	1 Patrol 3 Sup- port	Noncombat
Mauritius	3	87	Port Louis	Fishing Mar. Sci. <sup>b</sup>	Unk.	Unk.
Seychelles	3	--	Victoria			

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Comoro Is.	3	211	Moroni	Fishing		
La Reunion	3	--	St. Denis			
BIOT	3	--	--			

<sup>a</sup>Undeveloped

<sup>b</sup>Low Level

Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, "International Law of the Sea--A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences," Naval War College Review, February 1972, p. 65, 66; Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.; National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Activities of the Nations of Africa (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1969), p. 28, 29.

TABLE VI

## NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN REGION INFORMATION

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliation/ Dependence
Egypt	33,900,000	383,660	Cairo	Cotton Wheat Oil	Republic	Soviet Union
Sudan	15,800,000	967,495	Khartoum	Gum Arabic Cotton	Republic	
Ethiopia	25,000,000	471,776	Addis Ababa	Coffee Cereals Lt. Indus.	Constitu- tional Monarchy	United States
Somali Republic	2,800,000	246,200	Mogadi- shu	Livestock Bananas Corn	Republic	Soviet Union
Afars Issas	125,000	8,494	Djibouti	Dates Livestock Shipping	French Overseas Territory	France
Israel	2,900,000	7,992	Jerusalem	Industry Lt. Agri. Mining	Republic	United States
Jordan	2,300,000	37,737	Amman	Lt. Indus. Lt. Agri.	Republic	

Source: National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World  
(Washington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.



TABLE VII

## OCEAN ORIENTATION OF THE NORTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN REGION

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Egypt	12	769 <sup>a</sup>	Port Suez	Fishing Offshore Oil Mar. Sci. Port Facil.	12 Subs 15 DD Type 12 Patrol 66 Coastal	600 Fighter/ Bombers
Sudan	12	387	Port Sudan	Fishing Oil Explora- tion	6 Patrol Boats 2 Coastal	16 Fighters 16 Bombers
Ethiopia	12	546	Massawa Assab	Fishing Mineral Exploration	11 Patrol Gun- boats 5 Support	25 Bombers 21 Fighters
Somali Republic	12	1596	Berbera Magadishu Chisimaio	Fishing Oil Explora- tion Port Facil.	6 Patrol Boats	22 Fighters
Afars and Issas Terr.	12	132	Djibouti	Port Facil.		

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Israel	6	4 <sup>b</sup>	Elath	Shipping	3 Subs 1 DD 20 Patrol Boats 19 Coastal	400 Fighter/ Bombers
Jordan	3	15	Aqaba	Shipping	8 Patrol Boats	18 Bombers 15 Fighters

<sup>a</sup>Red Sea

<sup>b</sup>Gulf of Aqaba

Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, "International Law of the Sea--A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences," Naval War College Review, February 1972, p. 65, 66; Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.; National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Activities of the Nations of Africa (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1969), p. 28, 29.

TABLE VIII

POTENTIAL LOSS/GAIN POSSIBILITIES FROM  
AN OPEN SUEZ CANAL

State/Bloc	Type Gain/Loss
Russia	Strengthen Middle East Influence Provide shorter water route to Indian Ocean
Egypt	Probably recover some lost territory Source of income from shipping fees (estimated at \$200 million/year)
Western Europe	Lower oil costs (estimated savings, \$600 million/year)
United States	Reduction in Middle East ten- sions Lower tanker rates Expansion of Soviet naval presence
Israel	Reduction in likelihood of war Possible loss of east bank of Suez Canal

Source: "Behind the Pressure to Reopen Suez Canal,"  
U.S. News and World Report, 19 April 1971, p. 35.



TABLE IX

## ARABIAN PENINSULA/PERSIAN GULF REGION INFORMATION

State/ Territory	Population	Area <sub>2</sub> (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
Saudi Arabia	7,700,000	830,000	Riyadh	Oil Dates	Monarchy	United States
Yemen	5,700,000	75,290	San'a	Coffee Hides	Republic	
Peoples Demo- cratic Repub- lic of Yemen	1,300,000	111,075	Aden	Cotton Dried Fish	Republic	Russia China
128 Oman	565,000	82,000	Muscat	Oil Fishing Livestock Dates	Sultanate	Britain
Union of Arab Emirates	180,000	350	--	Oil Stamps	Union	Britain
Bahrain	200,000	231	Manama	Oil	Indepen- dent	Britain
Qatar	100,000	8,500	Doha	Oil	Indepen- dent	Britain
Kuwait	700,000	6,178	Al Kuwait	Oil	Constitu- tional Emirate	United States

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
Iraq	9,700,000	167,924	Baghdad	Oil Dates Rice Wheat	Republic	Russia Britain
Iran	28,400,000	636,293	Teheran	Oil Grains	Constitu- tional Monarchy	CENTO United States Russia

Source: National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World  
(Washington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.

TABLE X

## OCEAN ORIENTATION OF THE ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF REGION

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Saudi Arabia	12	1316	Jidda	Oil Shrimping	6 Patrol Boats 8 Hover- craft	75 Fighter Bombers
Yemen	12	244	Hodeida			40 Fighter Bombers (Est.)
Peoples Demo- cratic Repub- lic of Yemen	12	654	Aden	Fishing	3 Patrol Boats	35 Fighter Bombers (Est.)
Oman	3	1005	Muscat	Fishing		
Union of Arab Emirates		420	Dubai			
Bahrain		68	Al Manamah	Shrimping Fishing		
Qatar		204	Doha	Shrimping		4 Fighter Bombers



State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Kuwait	12	115	Al Kuwait	Shrimping Oil Pearls		12 Fighter Bombers
Iraq	12	10	Basra	Oil	12 Patrol Boats 13 Coastal	220 Fighter Bombers
Iran	12	990	Abadan	Oil	6 DL/DD 4 Patrol Boats 20 Coastal	140 Fighter Bombers

Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, "International Law of the Sea--A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences," Naval War College Review, February 1972, p. 65, 66; Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.; National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Activities of the Nations of the Near East and South Asia (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1969), p. 28, 29.

TABLE XI

## LOCATION AND AMOUNT OF OIL RESERVES IN THE WORLD

Area	Percent of World's Total Oil Reserves
Persian Gulf	62
Soviet Bloc	11
North Africa	9
United States	7
Venezuela	3
Canada	2
Other	6

Source: Charles Issawi, "The Politics and Economics of National Resources," Unpublished Paper, U.S. Department of State, FAR 13610 (Washington: 1971), p. 3.

TABLE XII

CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION IN THE MIDDLE EAST  
(million metric tons)

	First commer- cial produc- tion	<u>1966</u>	<u>1967</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1969</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1971 (est)</u>
Iran	1912	105.1	129.3	141.5	168.1	190.7	220
Saudi Arabia	1938	119.4	129.2	141.1	148.6	176.2	220
Libya	1961	72.3	84.3	126.0	149.8	160.1	142
Kuwait	1946	114.4	115.2	122.1	129.5	137.5	146
Iraq	1934	68.0	60.1	74.0	74.9	76.9	84
Abu Dhabi	1962	17.3	18.1	24.0	28.9	33.3	48
Neutral Zone	1954	22.3	21.7	22.1	23.3	26.0	28
Egypt	1909	6.3	6.2	11.3	15.5	21.7	--
Qatar	1949	13.8	15.5	16.4	17.3	17.3	22
Oman	1967	-	2.8	11.8	16.4	16.6	14
Syria	1968	-	-	0.4	3.2	4.2	--
Dubai	1969	-	-	-	0.5	4.3	--
Bahrain	1934	3.0	3.4	3.6	3.8	3.8	--
Turkey	1949	2.0	2.7	3.1	3.6	3.5	--
Israel	1955	<u>0.2</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>--</u>
Total		544.1	488.6	697.5	783.5	872.2	
% world total		32.0	32.3	35.2	36.7	37.0	

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, Quarterly Economic Review, Oil in the Middle East, Annual Supplement (London: 1971), p. 3.



TABLE XIII

OIL REVENUES OF THE MIDDLE EAST STATES  
(million dollars)

Country	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
Saudi Arabia	655	777	852	966	1008	1200
Libya	371	476	631	952	1132	1295
Iran	522	593	737	817	938	1076
Kuwait	671	707	718	766	812	897
Iraq	375	394	361	476	483	513
Abu Dhabi	34	100	106	153	191	231
Qatar	66	90	100	109	118	122
Oman	--	--	4	61	92	107
Bahrain	18	19	19	19	19	43
Dubai	--	--	--	--	2	

Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited, Quarterly Economic Review, Oil in the Middle East, Annual Supplement (London: 1971), p. 28.

TABLE XIV

## OIL PRODUCTION COSTS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

Country/Area	Dollars Per Barrel
United States	\$1.50
Soviet Union	\$1.00
Indonesia	\$ .80
Venezuela	\$ .60
Libya	\$ .15
Middle East	\$ .10

Source: Charles Issawi, "The Politics and Economics of National Resources," Unpublished Paper, U.S. Department of State, FAR 13610 (Washington: 1971), p. 6.

TABLE XV

## NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION INFORMATION

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
Pakistan	63,000,000	310,727	Islamabad	Cotton Industrial Devel.	Republic	United States British China Commonwealth/ CENTO/SEATO
India	554,600,000	1,261,811	New Delhi	Iron Ore Tea, Rice Sugar Cane Industrial Devel.	Republic	United States Russia British (Commonwealth)
Ceylon	12,600,000	25,332	Colombo	Tea Rubber	Parlia- mentary State	
Maldivé Is.	106,000	115 37,000 <sup>a</sup>	Male	Fishing	Republic	British
Laccadive Andaman Nicobar Is. Grps						
Bengladesh	73,900,000	54,800	Dacca	Rice Jute	Republic	India Russia

<sup>a</sup>Inland Waters Defined According to Archipelago Theory.

Source: National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World  
(Washington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.



TABLE XVI

## OCEAN ORIENTATION OF THE NORTHERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Pakistan	12	440	Karachi	Fishing	4 Subs 1 CL 7 DL/DD 14 Coastal	285 Fighter/ Bombers
India	12	2759	Bombay Calcutta Goa Vishakhapatnam Madras	Mar. Sci. Fishing Oil	3 CV/CL 4 Subs 21 DL/DD 30 Coastal	625 Fighter/ Bombers
Ceylon	12	650	Colombo Trincomalee	Fishing Mining		
Maldivé Is.	Archipelago Theory		Male			
Laccadive Andaman Nicobar Is. Grps.						
Bangladesh	12	310	Chittagong	Fishing	Unk.	Unk.

Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, "International Law of the Sea--A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences," Naval War College Review, February 1972, p. 65, 66; Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.; National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Activities of the Nations of Africa (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1969), p. 28, 29.

TABLE XVII

## EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION INFORMATION

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
Burma	27,700,000	261,789	Rangoon	Rice Teak Mining	Republic	
Thailand	36,200,000	198,456	Bangkok	Tin Rubber	Constitu- tional Monarchy	United States SEATO
Malaysia	10,800,000	128,430	Kuala Lumpur	Rubber Tin Rice	Parliamen- tary Federation	British ANZUK (Commonwealth)
Singapore	2,017,000	224	Singapore	Trade Center	Republic	British ANZUK (Commonwealth)
Indonesia	121,200,000	575,893	Djakarta	Oil Rubber Tin	Republic	
Australia	12,500,000	2,967,909	Canberra	Industry Mining Wool Meat	Parliamen- tary Democracy	ANZUK ANZUS SEATO (Commonwealth)

TABLE XVIII

## OCEAN ORIENTATION OF THE EASTERN INDIAN OCEAN REGION

State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
Burma	12	1230	Rangoon	Fishing	1 DL 89 Patrol/ Coastal	18 Fighter/ Bombers
Thailand	12	1299 (354)	None	Fishing Tin Mining	4 DL/DD 54 Patrol/ Boats Coastal	144 Fighter/ Bombers
Malaysia	12	1853 (440)	Port Swettenham Penang Malacca	Fishing	2 DL 34 Patrol/ Coastal	30 Fighter/ Bombers
Singapore	3	28	Singapore	Shipping Building Repair	3 Patrol Boats 1 Coastal	36 Fighter/ Bombers
Indonesia	Archipelago Theory (12)	19,784		Fishing Oil	12 Subs 1 Cl 15 DL/DD 145 Mix	122 Fighter/ Bombers
Australia	3	13,971	Perth Fremantle Geraldton	Fishing	4 Subs 1 CV 14 DD/DE 28 Mix	19 Fighter/ Bombers



State/ Territory	Terri- torial Sea (nm)	Coastline (nm)	Principal Ports	Ocean Usage	Navy	Air
New Zealand	3	2770 (0)	NA	NA	3 DL/DD 14 Coastal	22 Fighter/ Bombers
Cocos Christmas Is.						

Sources: Louis F.E. Goldie, "International Law of the Sea--A Review of States' Offshore Claims and Competences," Naval War College Review, February 1972, p. 65, 66; Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1971-1972 (London: 1971), v.p.; National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development, Marine Science Activities of the Nations of East Asia (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., April 1968), v.p.; U.S. Department of State, Sovereignty of the Sea (Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., October 1969), p. 28, 29.

TABLE XIX

COMPOSITION OF PREDOMINANT OIL PRODUCING COMPANIES  
AND THEIR STOCKHOLDINGS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

<u>Company</u>	<u>Percent of Stockholding</u>
Iraq Petroleum Company	
British Petroleum	23
Shell	23
Near East Development Corporation (Standard Oil, New Jersey, and Mobil)	23
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles	23
Participation and Explorations Corporation (Gulbenkian)	5
Iran Oil Participants (Consortium)	
British Petroleum	40
Shell	14
Standard Oil (New Jersey)	7
Mobil	7
Standard Oil of California	7
Texaco	7
Gulf	7
Compagnie Francaise des Petroles	6
Iricon	5
ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company)	
Standard Oil (New Jersey)	30
Mobil	10
Standard Oil of California	30
Texaco	30
Kuwait Oil Company	
British Petroleum	50
Gulf	50

Source: T.B. Millar, The Indian and Pacific Oceans:  
Some Strategic Considerations (London: Institute for Stra-  
tegic Studies, 1969), p. 7.

State/ Territory	Population	Area (mi) <sup>2</sup>	Capital	Economy	Status	Affiliations/ Dependence
New Zealand	2,781,000	103,736	Wellington	Wool Meat Hides	Parliamen- tary Democracy	ANZUK ANZUS SEATO (Commonwealth)
Cocos/ Christmas Is.						Australia

Source: National Geographic Society, National Geographic Atlas of the World  
(Washington, D.C.: 1970), v.p.